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DEFAMATION OF RELIGION: RUMORS
OF ITS DEATH ARE GREATLY
EXAGGERATED
Robert C. Blitt†
ABSTRACT
This Article explores the recent decisions by the United Nations
(“UN”) Human Rights Council and General Assembly to adopt
consensus resolutions aimed at “combating intolerance, negative
stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to
violence and violence against, persons based on religion or belief.”
These resolutions represent an effort to move past a decade’s worth
of contentious roll call votes in favor of prohibiting defamation of
religion within the international human rights framework. Although
labeled “historic” resolutions, this Article argues that the UN’s new
compromise approach endorsed in 2011—and motivated in part by
the desire to end years of acrimonious debate over the acceptability
of shielding religious beliefs from insult and criticism—is problematic
because it risks being exploited to sanction the continued prohibition
on defamation of religion and perpetuation of ensuing human rights
violations on the ground.
After briefly considering the history of defamation of religion at
the UN and the strategies employed by its principal proponent, the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (“OIC”), this Article turns to an
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. This Article
elaborates on remarks made during a panel discussion titled Blasphemy, Religious Defamation,
and Religious Nationalism: Threats to Civil Speech and Its Suppression at the 2012 Annual
Meeting for The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) in Washington, D.C. The
author wishes to thank Jessie Hill and Bernie Meyler for extending the invitation to participate
on the panel and also to John M. Murray and the staff of the Case Western Reserve Law Review
for their diligent and timely editorial review of the draft manuscript.
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assessment of the UN Human Rights Council’s 2011 consensus
Resolution 16/18. In light of the resolution’s objectives, this Article
explores the viability of the new international consensus around
“combatting intolerance” and tests to what extent, if any, the concept
of defamation of religion may be waning in practice. To this end, this
Article weighs statements, resolutions, and other undertakings of the
OIC and its member states with a particular emphasis on activities
that follow the adoption of Resolution 16/18.
Based on this analysis, the Article concludes that the resolutions
on combatting intolerance passed in 2011 represent a Clausewitzian
moment for many governments, particularly among OIC member
states. Essentially, support for the new international consensus on
combatting intolerance represents a cynical and strategic decision to
continue the campaign to legitimate a ban on defamation of religion
by other means. Accordingly, even if defamation of religion per se is
on hiatus from the UN, absent additional measures—including a
decisive repudiation of the concept’s validity—further international
efforts to implement measures for combatting intolerance risk
enabling an alternative framework in which governments continue
justifying, in the name of protecting religious belief, domestic
measures that punish the exercise of freedom of expression and
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief.
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INTRODUCTION
From 1999 through 2011, the United Nations (“UN”) hosted an
annual struggle between one group of states rallying to establish an
international norm prohibiting defamation of religion and another
group that was staunchly opposed to such a move. Over the course of
twelve years, the debate moved from the defunct UN Human Rights
Commission to the UN Human Rights Council (“UNHRC”) and even
spilled into the General Assembly (“UNGA”) and other UN
substructures. These UN bodies passed nearly twenty resolutions that,
among other things, “[w]elcom[ed] . . . the enactment or
strengthening of domestic frameworks and legislation to prevent the
defamation of religions,”1 “[u]nderscor[ed] the need to combat
defamation of religions,”2 and purported to authorize limitations on
the right to freedom of expression based on “respect for religions and
beliefs.”3 In addition to resolutions, these UN bodies also tasked
different Special Rapporteurs, the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, and even the UN Secretary General with compiling a total of
nearly thirty reports dedicated to defamation of religion.4
Admittedly, support for the international prohibition of defamation
of religion had been dwindling in more recent years, to the point
where the combination of abstaining states and states voting against
the annual resolutions outnumbered those voting in their favor.5
Nevertheless, both the UNHRC and UNGA continued to pass these
G.A. Res. 64/156, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/156 (Mar. 8, 2010).
Id. ¶ 21.
3 G.A. Res. 61/164, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/164 (Feb. 21, 2007).
4 Robert C. Blitt, The Bottom up Journey of “Defamation of Religion” from Muslim
States to the United Nations: A Case Study of the Migration of Anti-Constitutional Ideas, in 56
STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY, SPECIAL ISSUE HUMAN RIGHTS: NEW
POSSIBILITIES/NEW PROBLEMS, app. A, at 121, 200 (Appendix A) (Austin Sarat ed., 2011).
5 Robert C. Blitt, Should New Bills of Rights Address Emerging International Human
Rights Norms? The Challenge of “Defamation of Religion”, 9 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 19
(2010).
1
2

4/19/2012 1:07:09 PM

350

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2

resolutions successfully by a majority vote.6 Thus, the gradual decline
in support should not diminish the diplomatic feat represented by
UNHRC Resolution 16/18, which was adopted by consensus in
March 2011.7 Notably, this resolution successfully expunged any
mention of defamation of religion by the UN for the first time in over
a decade.8
More impressively still, by sidestepping explicit rejection of the
defamation-of-religion concept, the resolution’s substitute language
allowed the negotiating parties to extrapolate diametrically opposed
messages from its content. Thus, on one side, the U.S. was able to
claim an end to an acrimonious era responsible for creating a “false
divide that pit[ted] religious sensitivities against freedom of
expression.”9 At the same time, the Organization for Islamic
Cooperation (“OIC”)10—the principle backer of defamation of
religion resolutions at the UN—was able to declare Resolution 16/18
nothing more than the “exploring [of an] alternative approach[].”11 In
this vein, the OIC continues to advance support for defamation of
religion “on bloc” among its member states “in the true spirit of
solidarity and joint action on matters of vital concern . . . .”12 Placed
in context, these diametrically opposed positions signal a continuing
divide between the sides and raise questions concerning the viability
of implementing any consensus resolution in a manner that will
accord with existing international human rights law.
After briefly considering the tumultuous history of efforts to
secure an international prohibition against defamation of religion at
the UN, including strategies championed by its proponents, this
Article assesses the UN Human Rights Council’s 2011 consensus
Resolution 16/18, as well as statements made before and immediately
6 See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/156, supra note 1 (passing a resolution aimed at
combating the defamation of religions).
7 Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, Combating Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and
Stigmatization of, and Discrimination, Incitement to Violence and Violence Against, Persons
Based on Religion or Belief, 16th Sess., Mar. 24, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/18 (Apr. 12,
2011).
8 See id. ¶ 1 (stating that the concern was “serious instances of derogatory stereotyping,
negative profiling and stigmatization of persons based on their religion or belief”).
9 Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC) High-Level Meeting on Combating Religious Intolerance (July 15,
2011), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/07/168636.htm.
10 This group was formerly known as the Organization for the Islamic Conference. Org. of
Islamic Cooperation [OIC], On Changing the Name of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, Res. No. 4/38-Org, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/CFM-38/2011/ORG/RES (June 28–30, 2011).
11 OIC, On Combating Defamation of Religions, Res. No. 35/38-POL, compiled in
Resolutions on Political Affairs, at 79, ¶ 15, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/CFM-38/2011/POL/FINAL (June
28–30, 2011) [hereinafter OIC Res. No. 35/38-POL].
12 Id.
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following its adoption. In light of the resolution’s objectives, this
Article moves on to explore several related developments to ascertain
to what extent, if any, the concept of defamation of religion may be
waning and whether the international consensus around “combatting
intolerance” represents a viable alternative strategy moving forward.
Among other things, this Article considers OIC statements and
resolutions pertaining to defamation—particularly those issued
following the adoption of consensus resolutions by the UNHRC and
General Assembly, as well activities in other UN bodies, and other
related developments on the ground in OIC member states. This
analysis demonstrates that the shift to “combatting intolerance”
within the UN has suppressed but not resolved a fundamental and
ongoing dispute between the “West” and certain other states over the
nature of international human rights protections and the value of
universalism. By shifting this debate to an ambiguous and undertheorized area of law in the name of pursuing and validating an
“international consensus,”13 these new resolutions risk creating an
opportunity for certain states to prosecute perceived affronts to
religious belief with renewed vigor under the imprimatur of
international law. The likelihood of such a scenario is only heightened
by the fact that the OIC—the world’s largest international
organization after the UN—continues to actively identify and endorse
defamation of religion as a lawful and recognized international norm
inexorably and legitimately linked to the goal of combating
intolerance.
Faced with this reality, this Article concludes that the resolutions
on combatting intolerance represent a Clausewitzian moment for
many governments, particularly among OIC member states. In this
respect, support for the new international consensus on combatting
intolerance represents merely a cynical and strategic decision to
continue the campaign to legitimize a ban on defamation of religion
by other means. While defamation of religion per se might be on
hiatus from the UN, absent additional clarification—including a
decisive repudiation of the concept’s validity—further international
efforts directed at combatting intolerance risk enabling an alternative
framework for governments to continue justifying domestic measures
that punish the exercise of freedom of expression and freedom of
religion or belief in the name of protecting one or more select
religious beliefs.
13 Suzan Johnson Cook, U.S. Ambassador at Large for Int’l Religious Freedom, Remarks
for
Istanbul
Process
Conference
(Dec.
12,
2011),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/rm/2011/178640.htm.
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I. QUO VADIS DEFAMATION OF RELIGION?
A. Origins and Early History
For the OIC, the need to prohibit defamation of religion—or, more
accurately, defamation of Islam—has grown into an overriding raison
d’être. In the face of initial controversies at the UN predating the first
defamation of religion resolution issued in 1999,14 OIC member states
proclaimed that the motivation for insulting Islam stemmed only from
the desire “to generate conflict with Islamic peoples”15 and flatly
asserted that “the right to freedom of thought, opinion and
expression could in no case justify blasphemy.”16
In 1999, the OIC moved to have the UN Commission on Human
Rights (“UNCHR”) explicitly validate this perspective. Representing
the OIC, Pakistan called for the adoption of a resolution that urged
states “to take all necessary measures to combat hatred,
discrimination, intolerance and acts of violence, intimidation and
coercion” directed at the religion of Islam.17 Germany’s
representative criticized this approach “since it referred exclusively to
the negative stereotyping of Islam, whereas other religions had been
and continued to be subjected to various forms of discrimination,
intolerance and even persecution.”18 Germany further reported that it
“had unfortunately been impossible to find common ground” in initial
negotiations because OIC member states “had persisted in making the
draft resolution exclusive in nature and had found it necessary to
submit sub-amendments to amendments designed to correct the
balance of the text.”19
Ultimately, further negotiation led to the UNCHR’s consensus
approval of a resolution entitled “Defamation of religions.”20 At the
time, Pakistan hailed the OIC member states’ “considerable

See Blitt, supra note 4, at 142–43.
U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Subcomm’n On Prevention of
Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities, 49th Sess., 35th mtg. ¶ 14, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/SR.35 (Aug. 27, 1997) (providing testimony of the observer for Indonesia,
“speaking on behalf of the member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference”).
16 U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 65th mtg. ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.65 (Dec. 13, 1994)
(providing testimony of the representative from Iran, noting “the opinion expressed by the
Organization of the Islamic Conference”).
17 U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, 55th Sess., para. 9, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1999/L.40 (Apr. 20, 1999) (draft resolution).
18 U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, 55th Sess., 61st mtg. ¶ 3, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1999/SR.61 (Apr. 29, 1999).
19 Id. ¶ 9.
20 Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 1999/82, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/82 (Apr. 30, 1999).
14
15
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flexibility” in agreeing to a compromise resolution.21 Germany, on
behalf of the European Union (“EU”), stressed that the “last-minute
agreement reached should not . . . hide the fact that a high degree of
uncertainty remained as to the expediency of the Commission’s
continuing to deal with the issue in that way and in that context,”
adding that “they did not attach any legal meaning to the term
‘defamation’ as used in the title.”22 Despite this view, the consensus
resolution triggered the first mandated UN reporting on the topic and
positioned the UNCHR “to remain seized of the matter” moving
forward.23
The term “seized of the matter” captures literally the UN’s
preoccupation with defamation of religion over the decade that
followed. In addition, to attention morphing beyond the relatively
provincial domain of the UN’s specialized human rights body and
into the larger (and arguably more important) General Assembly,
defamation of religion received frequent references in subsequent
annual resolutions to the point where the term was being referenced
between ten to fifteen times per resolution.24 Notably, this expansion
was accompanied by a shift away from invoking defamation in the
relatively harmless context of preambulary front matter to including it
in the more significant operative paragraphs of a given resolution.25
This change was not accidental. Rather, it coincided with the
OIC’s stated desire to secure “[o]perative provisions prohibiting
blasphemy . . . in the text of [defamation resolutions].”26 Moreover, it
is in part because of this subtle yet dramatic shift that the OIC felt
sufficiently empowered by 2009 to declare that a norm prohibiting
defamation of religion had:
repeatedly been observed to command support by a majority
of the UN member states—a support that transcended the
confines of the OIC Member States. The succession of
UNGA and UNHRC resolutions on the defamation of
religions makes it a stand alone concept with international
legitimacy. It should not be made to stand out by creating the
21 U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, 55th Sess., 62nd mtg. ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1999/SR.62 (Apr. 30, 1999).
22 Id. ¶ 9. Indeed, at no point in over ten years did the UN ever put forth a working
definition of the chimera term “defamation of religion.” Blitt, supra note 5, at 16.
23 Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 1999/82, supra note 20, para. 7.
24 See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/156, supra note 1 (using the term “defamation” 12
times).
25 See Blitt, supra note 4.
26 OIC Secretary-General, Secretary General’s Report On Cooperation Between the OIC
and Regional & International Organizations, ¶ 23, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/ICFM-33/POL/SG.REP.13
(2006).
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impression that it somehow encroaches upon the freedom of
expression.
....
[Accordingly, a]ny denial of these facts constitutes a
contradiction of the established position of the international
community, the international legitimacy and above all the
main provisions of international law and international
humanitarian law.27
To underscore its vow to secure an international prohibition on the
defamation of religion at the UN,28 the OIC regularly passed its own
internal resolutions addressing defamation of Islam that called into
question existing international norms related to non-discrimination
and equality, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion or belief
for every individual.29 Beyond these annual resolutions, the OIC saw
fit in its revised 2008 charter to establish “combat[ing] defamation of
Islam” as one of the organization’s primary objectives.30 To that end,
the OIC requires, as a precondition for obtaining observer status, that
interested states provide a commitment to prohibit the defamation of
Islam.31
Despite the OIC’s consistent position, its promulgation of a norm
proscribing defamation of Islam remains deeply flawed for several
reasons. First, the application and enforcement of such a
blasphemy prohibition typically is discriminatory in practice
insofar as it protects only the government-sanctioned version of
Islam.32 Second, the OIC’s requirement that this offense be
27 Second Rep. of the OIC Observatory on Islamophobia, 36th Sess., May 23–25, 2009,
4–5, O.I.C. Doc. OIC–CS–2ndOBS–REP–FINAL (May 10, 2009).
28 See OIC, On Combating Islamophobia and Eliminating Hatred and Prejudice Against
Islam, Res. No. 34/34-POL, ¶ 5, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/34-ICFM/2007/POL/R.34 (calling “on the
Human Rights Council to adopt a universal declaration to incriminate the defamation of
religions”). Masood Khan, Pakistan’s UN ambassador, also reminded the UNHRC that the
OIC’s ultimate objective was nothing less than a “new instrument or convention” addressing
defamation. Steven Edwards, UN Anti-Blasphemy Measures Have Sinister Goals, Observers
Say,
CANWEST
NEWS
SERVICE
(Nov.
24,
2008),
http://www2.canada.com/theprovince/news/story.html?id=9b8e3a6d-795d-440f-a5de6ff6e78c78d5.
29 For a more detailed analysis of the resolutions leading up to 2010, see Blitt, supra note
4, at 155.
30 O.I.C. Charter art. 1, para. 12.
31 Under Article 6 of the 2011 rules governing observer status at the OIC, an “application
for Observer Status . . . shall include the applicant’s commitment to and respect for the
principles and objectives of the Charter . . . .” Rules Governing Observer Status at the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/4-EGG/2011/RES.OS/FINAL.
32 In certain cases, other select “divine religions” may be afforded protection, at least on
paper.
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criminalized is at odds with international efforts to limit penalties
for conventional defamation offenses to civil liability only. Third,
and possibly most problematic, the OIC’s impetus for protecting
Islam by manipulating the framework of international human
rights upends the foundational understanding that rights belong to
individuals rather than subjective concepts or beliefs.33
B. Defamation of Religion Creep: Early Efforts to Blend Defamation
into Incitement
The magnitude of the flaws associated with defamation of religion
virtually assured the decade of clashes at the UN. Indeed, these flaws
may also help explain the OIC’s attempt to legitimize the end goal of
protecting Islam against criticism or insult by other means. For
example, alongside its diplomatic effort to secure an annual
defamation of religion resolution, the OIC embarked upon an
increasingly contrived campaign to equate criticism of Islam with
incitement to religious hatred. This “alternative” approach—
embodied in the OIC’s position within the UNHRC’s Ad Hoc
Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards to the
International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (“Ad Hoc Committee”)34—represents nothing more
than an effort to “reclassify” defamation of religion within the legal
framework of incitement to make it more palatable to states that have
either abstained from or voted against the resolutions on defamation.35

For a more detailed exploration of these problems, see Blitt, supra note 4.
The Ad Hoc Committee is a UNHRC-created body established in 2006 and mandated
with elaborating inter alia “a convention or additional protocol(s) to the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [“CERD”] . . . providing
new normative standards aimed at combating . . . incitement to racial and religious hatred.”
Human Rights Council Dec. 3/103, Global Efforts for the Total Elimination of Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance and the Comprehensive Follow-Up to the
World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance and the Effective Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action, ¶ (a), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/DEC/3/103 (Apr. 23, 2007). The UNHRC’s decision to
establish the Ad Hoc Committee was split along voting lines similar to those for the defamation
of religion resolutions. See id. (showing most countries traditionally considered “western”
voting against the decision and many predominantly Muslim countries, including Indonesia,
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, voting for the decision).
35 Here, it is worth recalling that the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression has
called on governments to “refrain from introducing new norms which will pursue the same
goals as defamation laws under a different legal terminology such as disinformation and
dissemination of false information.” Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution
60/251 of March 2006 Entitled “Human Rights Council,” ¶ 82, Human Rights Council, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/4/27 (Jan. 2, 2007) (by Ambeyi Ligabo).
33
34
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The decision to create the Ad Hoc Committee is particularly
remarkable given that similar earlier efforts failed to demonstrate the
need for either a convention or additional protocol to the CERD as a
means of “gap filling” related to incitement to religious hatred. For
example, experts appointed by the UNHRC to address the content and
scope of substantive gaps in existing international instruments to
combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related
intolerance concluded “that religious intolerance combined with racial
and xenophobic prejudices is adequately covered under international
human rights instruments.”36 The experts concluded that the gap was
not in the international instruments themselves, but only in their
application, which the UN treaty bodies could remedy by issuing
guidance “as to the interpretative scope . . . [and] threshold of
application . . . .”37 Reinforcing this conclusion, the 2007 Study of the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination made no
mention whatsoever of measures to prevent defamation of religion or
incitement to religious hatred.38
As part of its lobbying efforts within the Ad Hoc Committee, the
OIC has sought to blur the critical distinction between defamation of
religion and incitement by proposing the following:
[The adoption of] some sort of additional protocol or
universal declaration for codifying freedom of expression in
the context of human responsibilities. It may be called an
additional protocol or universal declaration on ‘‘freedom of
expression and human responsibilities’’ . . . a comprehensive
framework is needed for analyzing national laws as well as
understanding their provisions. This could then be compiled
in a single universal document as guidelines for legislation—

36 Human
Rights Council, Intergovernmental Working Grp. on the Effective
Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, Report on the Study by
the Five Experts on the Content and Scope of Substantive Gaps in the Existing International
Instruments to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, ¶
130, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/WG.3/6 (Aug. 27, 2007). At most, the experts suggested that the
CERD committee “may wish to consider adopting a recommendation stating explicitly the
advantages of multicultural education in combating religious intolerance.” Id. The group also
endorsed “the importance of multicultural education, including education on the Internet, aimed
at promoting understanding, tolerance, peace and friendly relations between communities and
nations” as a means of combating defamation rather than any criminal sanctions. Id. ¶ 149.
37 Id. ¶ 152.
38 Human
Rights Council, Intergovernmental Working Grp. on the Effective
Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, Study of the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on Possible Measures to Strengthen
Implementation Through Optional Recommendations or the Update of its Monitoring
Procedures, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/WG.3/7 (June 15, 2007).
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aimed at countering “defamation of or incitement to religious
hatred and violence.”39
To further obfuscate the distinction between defamation and
incitement, the OIC has continued to advocate that the Ad Hoc
Committee endorse prohibitions on “deliberate and premeditated
insults and ridiculing,” “malicious and insulting attacks,” and
“ridiculing and insulting interpretation” of Islam40 backed by
sweeping criminal sanctions. Supporting this position, the OIC’s
voting allies within the Africa Group (which itself includes OIC
member states) have argued that the ‘‘scourges’’ of “‘Islamophobia,’
‘Anti-Semitism,’ ‘Christianophobia’ and ‘ideological racism’” should
“be criminalized in all their manifestations, and made punishable
offences in accordance with international human rights law.”41 Under
the theme ‘‘[a]dvocacy and incitement to racial, ethnic, national and
religious hatred,” the Africa Group demanded the Ad Hoc Committee
endorse criminal punishment for those perpetrating, “instigating,
aiding or abetting” the following actions:
(a) Public insults and defamation . . . against a person or
group of persons on the grounds of their . . . religion . . . ;
(b) The public expression of prejudice that has the purpose or
effect of denigrating a group of persons on the basis of the
above-mentioned grounds;
(c) The public dissemination or distribution, or the production
of written, audio or visual or other material containing

39 Transcript of the Concluding Session of the Seminar on Articles 19 and 20, Organized
By the Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, Switz., Oct. 2, 2008, Remarks
by Mojtaba Amiri Vahid, Deputy of the Permanent Observer Missions of the OIC to the UN
Office in Geneva, 3 (emphasis added) (transcript on file with the author). In the same statement,
Vahid downplayed the efficacy of education and dialogue without the imposition of additional
criminal sanctions.
40 These forms of expression are expressly rejected in the text of the ambassador’s letter.
Letter from Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations and Other International
Organizations (Oct. 29, 2009), in Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and All Forms of
Discrimination: Comprehensive Implementation of and Follow-Up to the Durban Declaration
and Programme of Action, Human Rights Council, Feb. 17, 2010, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/CRP.1
(Annex 1).
41 Human Rights Council, Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of Complementary
Standards, Outcome Referred to in Paragraph 2(D) of the Road Map on the Elaboration of
Complementary Standards, ¶ 6(d), UN Doc. A/HRC/AC.1/2/2 (Aug. 26, 2009) [hereinafter UN
Doc. A/HRC/AC.1/2/2]. See also African Group Action Points for the “Outcome” Document on
Complementary International Standards (submitted by Egypt on behalf of the Africa Group)
(on file with author) (stating same).
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manifestations of racism and racial discrimination . . .
[including defamation of religion].42
Similarly, addressing the theme of ‘‘[d]iscrimination based on
religion or belief’’ within the Ad Hoc Committee, the OIC called for,
inter alia, criminal liability for those “who commit, instigate, or aid
and abet . . . directly or indirectly” the following:
(d) . . . public insults and defamation threats against a person
or a grouping of persons on the grounds of their . . . religion
. . . ; [and]
(e) . . . publication of material that negatively stereotypes,
insults, or uses offensive language on matters regarded by
followers of any religion or belief as sacred or inherent to
their dignity as human beings, with the aim of protecting their
fundamental human rights.43
Nowhere in the OIC’s submissions testing the boundaries of
advocacy and incitement to racial, ethnic, national and religious
hatred does the organization stipulate or explore the need for
normative standards that would balance protection against
“defamation” with the right to freedom of expression and freedom of
religion or belief. In this context, the OIC fails to acknowledge or
address standards that would relate to evidence of actual defamation,
the requirement of intent, ascertaining the connection between
perceived insult and actual incitement, or the principle of
proportionality.
Also missing is any recognition that Article 20(2) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) is
intended to target only the most extreme purposeful advocacy of
incitement to imminent forms of discrimination, hostility, and
42 UN Doc. A/HRC/AC.1/2/2, supra note 41, at ¶ 20 (emphasis added). The OIC’s leap
towards inclusion of defamation of religion is premised on the finding by a “former Special
Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance . . . that the increasing trend in defamation of religions cannot be dissociated from a
profound reflection on the ominous trends of racism [and] racial discrimination . . . .” Id. ¶ 69. A
letter from Iran’s mission to the UN reiterates this position. See Letter from Permanent Mission
of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights AntiDiscrimination Unit (May 29, 2009) (on file with author).
43 UN Doc. A/HRC/AC.1/2/2, supra note 41, at ¶ 27 (emphasis added). The language in
Part (d) indicates that the Ad Hoc Committee may have lost something in translation. The
original OIC submission does not require that the offense of defamation be directed at a person:
“legal restrictions to public insults and defamation, public incitement to violence, threat against
a person or a grouping of persons . . . on the grounds of their race, colour, language, religion,
nationality, or national or ethnic origin.” Letter from Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the
United Nations and other International Organizations (May 30, 2009).
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violence.44 This high threshold prompted the UN Special Rapporteur
on freedom of religion or belief to conclude that “expressions should
only be prohibited under Article 20 if they constitute incitement to
imminent acts of violence or discrimination against a specific
individual or group.”45 The Special Rapporteur further cautioned:
against confusion between a racist statement and an act of
defamation of religion. The elements that constitute a racist
statement are not the same as those that constitute a statement
defaming a religion. To this extent, the legal measures, and in
particular the criminal measures, adopted by national legal
systems to fight racism may not necessarily be applicable to
defamation of religion.46
Against these findings, the OIC’s demand for wide-ranging
mandatory criminal liability for defamation-based offenses in the
context of incitement to religious hatred neglects the need for a fact
specific and contextual inquiry into such prosecutions and, moreover,
is woefully out of touch with existing international norms. The blunt
conclusion issued jointly nearly a decade ago by the UN and
Organization of American States (“OAS”) special rapporteurs on
freedom of expression together with the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (“OSCE”) Representative on Freedom of the
Media is also worth recalling:
Criminal defamation laws . . . are unnecessary to protect
reputations. The threat of criminal sanctions[,] imprisonment
and prohibitive fines . . . exerts a significant chilling effect on
freedom of expression which cannot be justified. Criminal
defamation laws are frequently abused, being used in cases
which do not involve the public interest and as a first, rather
44 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art.
20(2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) A (Dec. 16, 1966) (“Any advocacy of national, racial or
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be
prohibited by law.”); see also ARTICLE 19, THE CAMDEN PRINCIPLES ON FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND EQUALITY 10, n.3 (2009) (stating a definition of incitement that is based on
Article 20(2) as “refer[ring] to statements about national, racial or religious groups which create
an imminent risk of discrimination, hostility or violence”), and Heiner Bielefeldt, Frank La Rue,
& Githu Muigai, OHCHR Expert Workshops on the Prohibition of Incitement to National,
Racial or Religious Hatred, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 11 (Apr.
6–7, 2011) (endorsing Principle 12 of Article 19’s Camden Principles),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Religion/JointSRsubmissionforNairobiworkshop.pdf.
45 Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief and Special Rapporteur on
Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance,
Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled “Human
Rights Council,” Human Rights Council, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/3 (Sept. 20, 2006) (by
Asma Jahangir and Doudou Diène).
46 Id. ¶ 49.
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than last resort. Criminal defamation laws should be
abolished and replaced with appropriate civil defamation
laws.47
The UN Human Rights Committee has consistently reaffirmed this
viewpoint, calling on states to decriminalize conventional defamation
laws and to cap the amount of possible damages awarded in civil
lawsuits.48
Allowing the OIC and others to conflate defamation of religion
with incitement to religious hostility is problematic for two related
reasons. First, under the conflated definition, states can use an
otherwise legitimate international norm to prosecute insults or
criticism directed at religious beliefs simply by applying a relaxed
interpretation to terms such as “advocacy,” “incitement” and
“hostility.” Second, permitting a dilution of the stringent standards
associated with ICCPR Article 20(2) may have the effect of
cheapening the coin, which in turn may give rise to other states
disregarding their obligation to prohibit genuine advocacy of hostility
that actually constitutes incitement to imminent violence and leaves
more immediately threatening acts unchecked.
47 Santiago Canton, Freimut Duve, & Abid Hussain, Statement Regarding Key Issues and
Challenges
in
Freedom
of
Expression
(Mar.
7,
2000),
http://www.ifex.org/international/2000/03/07/report_on_key_issues_and_challenges. In the U.S.
context, one observer has remarked:
Criminal libel law . . . is a useless and increasingly unconstitutional remedy for the redress
of racial or ethnic group defamation. . . . Criminal defamation is not recognized in the Model
Penal Code or by a leading criminal law treatise. Even though racial and ethnic defamation
affect the public weal and not merely individual interests, the criminal law of libel is no longer
effective to redress that group wrong.
Michael J. Polelle, Racial and Ethnic Group Defamation: A Speech-Friendly Proposal, 23
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 213, 257–258 (2003).
48 See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Russian Federation, ¶ 24(b),,UN Doc. CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6 (Nov. 24, 2009) (noting
that the “State party should . . . [d]ecriminali[z]e defamation and subject it only to civil lawsuits,
capping any damages awarded”); see also Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of
the Human Rights Committee: Mexico, ¶ 20(d), UN Doc. CCPR/C/MEX/CO/5 (May 17, 2010)
(suggesting that the State party should “[t]ake steps to decriminalize defamation in all states.”);
Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: The Former
Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia, ¶ 6, UN Doc. CCPR/C/MKD/CO/2 (Apr. 17, 2008) (noting
that the Committee “welcomes the amendments to the Criminal Code, decriminalizing the
offence[] of defamation . . . as steps in the right direction towards ensuring freedom of opinion
and expression particularly of journalists and publishers”); Human Rights Comm., Concluding
observations of the Human Rights Committee: Italy, ¶ 19, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ITA/CO/5 (Apr.
24, 2006) (“The State party should ensure that defamation is no longer punishable by
imprisonment.”). The UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 34 reiterates this
position: “States parties should consider the decriminalization of defamation and, in any case,
the application of the criminal law should only be countenanced in the most serious of cases and
imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty.” Human Rights Comm., General Comment No.
34: Article 19: Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 47, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12,
2011).
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The need to more clearly delineate and preserve this bright line
distinction is even more pressing due to the nature of the compromise
struck in Resolution 16/18 and specifically the failure to
authoritatively repudiate the concept of defamation of religion. By
agreeing to shift the debate into a decidedly less confrontational space
made possible by vague terms open to subjective interpretation, the
United States and others may have complicated the task of identifying
and effectively confronting limitations on free expression and
freedom of religion or belief motivated by the desire to curb
perceived criticism or insult of religious beliefs. Indeed, while
achieving consensus may be laudable, moving into this mostly
untested gray zone seems particularly ill-advised given the OIC’s
ongoing effort to graft defamation of religion onto the framework of
incitement, even at the expense of delegitimizing existing
international law.
II. RESOLUTION 16/18: ENDING A DECADE OF “DIVISIVE DEBATE”?
A. Resolution 16/18: Crafting a Consensus
On its surface, UNHRC Resolution 16/18 on “Combating
Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and Stigmatization of, and
Discrimination, Incitement to Violence and Violence Against,
Persons Based on Religion or Belief”49 represents a turning point
insofar as it breaks the longstanding UNHRC practice of endorsing an
annual resolution explicitly decrying defamation of religions. The
resolution also ends a lengthy paper trail of mandated annual
reporting dedicated to defamation of religion produced by various UN
bodies. In place of this, the UNHRC, acting by consensus, agreed to
condemn “any advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence,” while recognizing
that “interfaith and intercultural dialogue . . . can be among the best
protections against religious intolerance and can play a positive role
in strengthening democracy and combating religious hatred.”50
To this end, the resolution sets out a number of concrete
suggestions intended “to foster a domestic environment of religious
tolerance, peace and respect”51 and to “promot[e] the ability of
members of all religious communities to manifest their religion, and
to contribute openly and on an equal footing to society.”52 For
49
50
51
52

Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, supra note 7.
Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6(b).
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example, the UNHRC calls on states to “[s]peak[] out against
intolerance, including advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.”53 The resolution
also urges states to adopt, in accord with ICCPR Article 20(2),
“measures to criminalize incitement to imminent violence based on
religion or belief.”54 Lastly, the resolution serves—albeit
unofficially—as the departure point for what has come to be known
as the “Istanbul Process,” which is a series of meetings intended to
“spur implementation of the specific actions called for in Resolution
16/18”55 by, among other things, “sharing best practices.”56
B. Consensus? Yes. End to Defamation? No.
Based on the remarks of those states that continue to tout the
legitimacy of prohibiting defamation of religion, it is evident that the
putative norm is still very much alive and well, despite the new
consensus approach intended to supplant it. For example, addressing
the high level segment of the 16th Session of the UNHRC before it
passed Resolution 16/18, OIC Secretary General Ekmeleddin
Ihsanoglu reiterated his call for “establishing an Observatory at the
Office of the High Commissioner to monitor acts of defamation of all
religions.”57 Ihsanoglu lauded the OIC’s flexibility in negotiations,
expressing an expectation for “some reciprocity,” and asserted that
the “perception that supporting [defamation of religion] would
throttle one’s right to freedom [of] expression is only a myth.”58
Several weeks later, the ambassador from Pakistan, Zamir Akram,
articulated the OIC’s view more bluntly in his introductory remarks
immediately preceding UNHRC adoption of the resolution:
This draft resolution addresses a number of issues over which
the OIC has been expressing concern over the years. Having
Id. ¶ 5(e).
Id. ¶ 5(f). That threshold seems to align with American constitutional law and precludes
criminal sanctions for incitement to discrimination, hostility, or non-imminent violence. See
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curium) (noting that incitement is protected
speech unless the speaker calls for “imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action”).
55 U.S. Dep’t of State, The “Istanbul Process for Combating Intolerance and
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief” Implementing Human Rights Council (HRC)
Resolution 16/18 December Expert Level Meeting, HUMANRIGHTS.GOV, 2,
http://www.humanrights.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/20111204-Istanbul-Process.pdf (last
visited Mar. 16, 2012). The Istanbul Process is discussed at greater length in Part III.C infra.
56 Id.
57 Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Sec’y Gen., OIC, Statement at the High Level Segment of the
16th Session of the Human Rights Council 9 (Mar. 1, 2011), available at
http://www.eyeontheun.org/assets/attachments/documents/9429hrc16sessionoic.pdf.
58 Id. at 10.
53
54
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said that, I want to state categorically that this resolution does
not replace the OIC’s earlier resolutions on combatting
defamation of religions which were adopted by the Human
Rights Council and continue to remain valid.59
Reinforcing this position, the Saudi Arabian ambassador in his
explanation before the vote observed that:
This text contains many positive points . . . . [However,] this
text . . . is not replacing the other existing text which also
criminalizes attack on religion. This text still remains valid
. . . [and events like the burning of the Koran in the United
States] calls on us all to redouble our efforts against this
phenomenon.60
Despite these pointed statements, U.S. Ambassador Eileen
Chamberlain Donahoe chose not to refute the assertion that an
international norm prohibiting defamation of religion remained
valid.61 Instead, she left it to the representative from Hungary to
politely demur: “insofar as they are directed at the EU we do not
agree with the . . . allegations made by the distinguished Ambassador
of Pakistan in . . . his introduction to this resolution.”62
59 Zamir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pak. to the U.N. Office at Geneva,
Remarks at the 16th Session, 46th Plenary Meeting of the Human Rights Council (Mar. 24,
2011)
(emphasis
added),
available
at
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/sixteenth/hrc110324pm2eng.rm?start=00:39:20&end=00:49:44. For video of the entire March 24, 2011 proceedings, see
U.N.,
15:00–18:00
46th
Plenary
Meeting,
http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=110324#pm2 (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
Remarkably, this loaded statement received virtually no press coverage, netting only four hits
via a Google search. Search Results for “state categorically that this resolution does not replace
the OIC’s earlier resolutions on combatting defamation of religions,” GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&safe=off&site=webhp&q=%22state+categorically+that+
this+resolution+does+not+replace+the+OIC’s+earlier+resolutions+on+combating+defamation+
of+religions%22&oq=%22state+categorically+that+this+resolution+does+not+replace+the+OI
C’s+earlier+resolutions+on+combating+defamation+of+religions%22 (last visited Mar. 16,
2012).
60 Ahmed Suleiman Ibrahim Alaquil, Saudi Arabia Ambassador to the Human Rights
Council, Remarks at the 16th Session, 46th Plenary Meeting of the Human Rights Council (Mar.
24,
2011)
(emphasis
added),
available
at
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/sixteenth/hrc110324pm2eng.rm?start=00:50:10&end=00:51:42.
61 See Eileen Chamberlain Donahoe, U.S. Ambassador to the Human Rights Council,
Remarks at the 16th Session, 46th Plenary Meeting of the Human Rights Council (Mar. 24,
2011),
available
at
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/sixteenth/hrc110324pm2eng.rm?start=00:54:04&end=00:58:47 (noting that the resolution only allows for punishment
when expression incites imminent violence, but not addressing the OIC members’ claims that
the prior resolutions remained valid).
62 András Dékány, Permanent Representative of Hung. to the U.N. Office at Geneva,
Remarks at the 16th Session, 46th Plenary Meeting of the Human Rights Council (March 24,
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Following its adoption by consensus, numerous officials and
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) lined up to applaud
Resolution 16/18 as a death knell for defamation of religion. The
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
(“USCIRF”), long critical of the OIC’s effort to install a norm
prohibiting defamation of religion, offered an observation seemingly
disconnected from reality: “Tragically, it took the assassinations of
two prominent Pakistani officials who opposed that country’s
draconian blasphemy laws . . . to convince the OIC that the annual
defamation of religions resolutions embolden extremists rather than
bolster religious harmony.”63 Likewise, Human Rights Watch
ventured that the shift to combating intolerance “implicitly rejects the
‘defamation of religions’ concept.”64
Oddly, neither of these statements sought to account for the
multiple reassertions of the norm’s validity expressed during the
Council session. Perhaps more cautiously, the UN’s Special
Rapporteurs on Freedom of Religion or Belief, on Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, and on Contemporary Forms of Racism
jointly declared the adoption of Resolution 16/18 a “positive
development.”65 During an Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (“OHCHR”)-sponsored expert workshop in Nairobi,
Kenya, they expressed their collective appreciation that “the
[UNHRC] has—after years of debate—ultimately found a way to
unanimously address [the] worrying phenomena [of intolerance,
negative stereotyping, discrimination, and incitement] without
referring to concepts or notions that would undermine international
human rights law.”66 At the same time, however, they “emphasize[d]
the principle that individuals rather than religions per se are the

2011),
available
at
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/sixteenth/hrc110324pm2eng.rm?start=00:59:05&end=01:02:22 (speaking on behalf of the EU).
63 Press Release, U.S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom, USCIRF Welcomes Move
Away from “Defamation of Religions” Concept (Mar. 24, 2011), http://uscirf.gov/newsroom/press-releases/3570-uscirf-welcomes-move-away-from-defamation-of-religionsconcept.html.
64 UN: Rights Body Acts Decisively on Iran, Cote d’Ivoire, HUMAN R IGHTS WATCH (Mar.
25, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/25/un-rights-body-acts-decisively-iran-cote-divoire. Human Rights Watch attributed particular significance to the fact that “the new
resolution was proposed by the Organization of the Islamic Conference and adopted by
consensus.” Id.
65 Heiner Bielefeldt, Frank La Rue, & Githu Muigai, OHCHR Expert Workshops on the
Prohibition of Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred, OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER
FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
8
(Apr.
6–7,
2011),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Religion/JointSRsubmissionforNairobiworkshop.pdf.
66 Id.

4/19/2012 1:07:08 PM

2011]

DEFAMATION OF RELIGION

365

rights-holders.”67 These statements were reiterated by the special
rapporteurs in their joint submissions to the follow up OHCHR
workshops held in Bangkok, Thailand68 and Santiago, Chile during
2011.69
III. LIVING IN A POST-CONSENSUS WORLD: THE WEST DREAMS
WHILE THE OIC SCHEMES
Despite the general fanfare and congratulatory accolades
surrounding the consensus vote on Resolution 16/18, neither the
content of the resolution nor the remarks of state representatives at the
UNHRC offer anything that decisively invalidates or discredits the
recognition of an international prohibition on defamation of religion.
In fact, as the following sections indicate, despite the omission of the
term “defamation of religion” from UN resolutions in 2011, the OIC
continues to support this norm actively as a fait accompli. This
consistent position denigrates the spirit of consensus in which the
resolutions combatting intolerance ostensibly were passed. More
disturbingly, this behavior may ultimately undermine the very
objectives to which Resolution 16/18 aspires by condoning the
continued prosecution of blasphemy-based offenses and potentially
discrediting otherwise legitimate efforts to combat discrimination and
incitement.
A. The UN’s Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of
Complementary Standards
Following the UNHRC’s 2006 decision, the Ad Hoc Committee
on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards embarked on a series
of working sessions “to draw up the requisite legal instruments”70 that
would address existing gaps in the CERD and formulate new
Id.
Heiner Bielefeldt, Frank La Rue, & Githu Muigai, OHCHR Expert Workshops on the
Prohibition of Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred, OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER
FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
12
(July
6–7,
2011)
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/articles1920_iccpr/docs/expert_papers_Bangkok/
SRSubmissionBangkokWorkshop.pdf.
69 Heiner Bielefeldt, Frank La Rue, & Githu Muigai, OHCHR Expert Workshops on the
Prohibition of Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred, OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER
FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
10
(Oct.
12–13,
2011)
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Expression/ICCPR/Santiago/JointSRSubmissionSantia
go.pdf.
70 Human Rights Council Dec. 3/103, Global Efforts for the Total Elimination of Racism,
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance and the Comprehensive Follow-Up
to the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance and the Effective Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action, ¶ (a), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/DEC/3/103 (Apr. 23, 2007).
67
68
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normative standards aimed at combating incitement to racial and
religious hatred.71 As noted above, the OIC attempted to use this
venue to blur the line between defamation and incitement and press
for a new treaty prohibiting insults and ridicule of religion.72 In part
because of opposition to this approach, the meetings held from 2008
through 2010 were characterized by an overriding sense of discord
and contention so profound that the position of ChairpersonRapporteur remained vacant for an extended period.73 But what of the
Ad Hoc Committee’s session following the passage of Resolution
16/18, which occurred in a new atmosphere of consensus that put
aside the previous “false divide that pits religious sensitivities against
freedom of expression”?74 The second part of the Ad Hoc
Committee’s third session, which convened April 11–21, 2011, is
instructive in this regard.
After an abortive start to the third session and a delay of nearly six
months, member states reconvened and agreed that Jerry Matthews
Matjila, Permanent Representative of South Africa, would serve as
chairperson-rapporteur for the committee.75 In turn, Matjila proposed
four initial topics for discussion intended to reflect “burning issues of
the times” and “key topics and concerns of participants”:76 (1)
“xenophobia”; (2) “incitement to racial, ethnic and religious hatred”;
(3) “racial and xenophobic acts committed through information and
communication technologies”; and (4) “racial, ethnic and religious
profiling.”77 Matjila suggested that the committee address incitement
to racial, ethnic and religious hatred specifically because it “had been
the focus of attention during recent sessions of the Human Rights
Council, [and] . . . the Council’s last session had adopted a resolution
by consensus and that he wished to build thereon.”78 The United
States expressed the view that any discussion in the Ad Hoc
Committee should reflect the new consensus language contained in
71 Id. ¶ (a). For additional background on the Ad Hoc Committee, see Ad Hoc Committee
on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER
FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/racism/adhoccommittee.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
72 See supra Part I.B.
73 Human Rights Council, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of
Complementary Standards on its Third Session, ¶ 4, UN Doc. A/HRC/18/36 (Sept. 6, 2011)
[hereinafter HRC Ad Hoc Comm. Report].
74 Stephen Kaufman, Clinton Says More Effort Needed to Combat Religious Intolerance,
IIP
DIGITAL
(July
15,
2011),
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2011/07/20110715180740nehpets0.7188227.ht
ml#axzz1o12afMnj (quoting Secretary of State Hilary Clinton).
75 HRC Ad Hoc Comm. Report, supra note 73, ¶¶ 4, 6, 7.
76 Id. ¶ 15.
77 Id. ¶ 14.
78 Id. ¶ 16.
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Resolution 16/18, namely “combating advocacy of national, ethnic,
religious and racial hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence.”79 But other participants
disagreed, leaving the formal meetings bogged without consensus
over which issues the committee should in fact address.
In an attempt to overcome the impasse, the Ad Hoc Committee
adjourned and shifted into “informal consultations” facilitated by
Mothusi Bruce Rabasha Palai, the permanent representative of
Botswana.80 Following these efforts, Palai reported back that “[i]n
view of the need to keep the participants working together, topic 2
‘Advocacy and incitement to racial, ethnic, national and religious
hatred’ had been dropped.”81 According to Palai’s report, the EU
“seemed to have major difficulty with the wording of the topic’s
title,”82 whereas the United States reiterated its concern as being
“more one of characterization than of reality or substance,” and
“suggested that the Ad Hoc Committee move forward on the basis of
[the UNHRC] consensus resolution rather than revert to previous
terminology and focus.”83
Ultimately, the Ad Hoc Committee could only agree to move
forward on discussions relating to the topics of xenophobia and the
“[e]stablishment, designation or maintaining of national mechanisms
with competences to protect against and prevent all forms and
manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and
related intolerance.”84 These discussions reveal a continuing
overarching procedural disagreement over whether perceived gaps in
normative standards require new treaties or protocols or can be
addressed within existing frameworks through more effective
implementation.85 Coupled with the obvious ongoing substantive
tensions alluded to above, these factors together may help explain
additional delays in the Ad Hoc Committee’s scheduled meetings and
anticipated work product.86 The chairperson’s plea for “other regions
Id. ¶ 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. ¶ 21.
81 Id. ¶ 23.
82 Id. ¶ 27.
83 Id. ¶ 29 (emphasis added).
84 Id. ¶ 63.
85 For example, the United States “expressed the need for practical discussions that
focused on better implementation of existing norms, as the problem was not that there were gaps
in the existing international legal framework, but rather that there were gaps in practical
implementation of existing standards.” Id. ¶ 67. In contrast, the views of the OIC and the Africa
Group held that before addressing national mechanisms, “new gaps required the elaboration of
new standards” and “[n]ational mechanisms alone could not fill gaps and it was only logical to
set norms first.” Id. ¶¶ 71–72. This underlying dispute led the EU to observe that “the Ad Hoc
Committee appeared to be at a standstill again . . . .” Id. ¶ 85.
86 The Ad Hoc Committee’s fourth session was postponed from late 2011 to April 2012.
79
80
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to consider if they were now ready to take on the responsibility of
serving as Chairperson of the Ad Hoc Committee” may also have a
role in the delay.87
The UNHRC’s review of Ad Hoc Committee’s progress provides
additional insight into the status of the “consensus” reached in
Resolution 16/18. During a general debate addressing the Ad Hoc
Committee’s third report held in September 2011,88 Pakistan, on
behalf of the OIC, explained that Resolution 16/18 was
an attempt by the OIC to build consensus on an issue of vital
importance . . . by identifying ways and means to deal with
the growing problem of religious intolerance and
discrimination, and incitement to hatred and violence based
on religion. However, as projected by some, it is important to
emphasize that resolution 16/18 did not replace the OIC’s
earlier resolutions on combating defamation of religions
which were adopted by the Human Rights Council and
continue to remain valid.89
From the OIC’s perspective, then, it would be perfectly legitimate for
the Ad Hoc Committee to consider and propose a new treaty or
protocol addressing defamation of religion in the context of
incitement to religious hatred. In support of this understanding, the
representative from Kuwait reasoned that the “constitution of the state
of Kuwait is in conformity with the rules and regulations of human
rights conventions” and thus, “[l]egally, it is not allowed to express
any opinion that includes scorn or that degrades or demeans any faith

Human Rights Council, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary
Standards on its Fourth Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/78 (Dec. 1, 2011).
87 HRC Ad Hoc Comm. Report, supra note 73, ¶ 108.
88 See Human Rights Council Holds General Debate on Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS
(Sept.
27,
2011),
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11441&LangID=E
(providing testimony in an unofficial form).
89 Saeed Sarwar, Draft Statement by Pakistan, on Behalf of the OIC Member States,
During General Debate Under Agenda Item 9 During the 18 th Session of the Human Rights
Council
(Geneva,
27
September
2011),
2,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/18thSession/OralStatements/
1%20Pakistan%20%28OIC%29%2031.pdf (password protected). Similar to remarks offered
before adoption of Resolution 16/18, the U.S. statement delivered during the general debate
does not contradict the OIC assertion concerning defamation of religion. See Emily Narkis,
Remarks Delivered on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Forms of
Intolerance, Follow-Up and Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action at the Human Rights Council 18th Session (Sept. 27, 2011), available at
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/18thSession/OralStatements/
5%20United%20States%2031.pdf (password protected).
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or religion . . . be it in challenging the beliefs or the teachings and
traditions. This applies [to] all religions without naming one
religion.”90 Likewise, the Moroccan delegate stressed the importance
of the Ad Hoc Committee’s work and associated its own position with
that of the OIC and Africa Group.91
B. OIC Resolutions and Other Activities
Despite the ostensible existence of a new consensus view on
incitement at the UN, delegates to the UNHRC cannot be faulted for
insisting on the continued legitimacy of defamation of religion within
in the Council and elsewhere. In reality, these government officials
are merely restating another consensus—yet contradictory—view
maintained by the OIC that continues to “call upon the international
community to take effective measures to combat the defamation of
religions . . . .”92 Indeed, the resolutions emerging from the OIC’s
most recent Council of Foreign Ministers—which followed months
after the unanimous UNHRC endorsement of Resolution 16/18—
plainly establish that securing a prohibition against defamation of
religion remains one of the organization’s overriding objectives,
despite any “historic”93 UN consensus relating to incitement.
For example, Resolution No. 34/38-POL On Combating
Islamophobia and Eliminating Hatred and Prejudice Against Islam
generally “[r]eaffirm[s] all OIC resolutions, which stress, inter alia,
the need for effectively combating defamation of Islam and
incitement to religious hatred, hostility, violence and discrimination
against Islam and Muslims, as well as the growing trend of
Islamophobia.”94 More specifically, the resolution affirms the OIC’s
commitment to securing a prohibition against defamation that applies
90 Haya Al-Duraie, Kuwait Ambassador to Human Rights Council, Remarks at 18th
Session, 31st Plenary Meeting of the Human Rights Council (Sept. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2011/09/kuwait-item-9-general-debate-31st-plenarymeeting.html.
91 Omar Rabi, Morocco Ambassador to the Human Rights Council, Remarks at the 18th
Session, 31st Plenary Meeting of the Human Rights Council (Sept. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2011/09/morocco-item-9-clustered-id-on-racism-30thplenary-meeting.html.
92 OIC, OIC Astana Declaration: Peace, Cooperation and Development, ¶ 16, O.I.C. Doc.
OIC/CFM-38/2011/ASTANA DEC/FINAL (June 30, 2011).
93 Suzan Johnson Cook, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Int’l Religious Freedom, Remarks:
Promoting Respect and Tolerance for International Religious Freedom (Sept. 13, 2011),
available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/rm/2011/172232.htm.
94 OIC, On Combating Islamophobia and Eliminating Hatred and Prejudice Against
Islam, OIC Res. No. 34/38-POL, compiled in Resolutions on Political Affairs, at 75, O.I.C. Doc.
OIC/CFM-38/2011/POL/FINAL (June 28–30, 2011) (emphasis removed) [hereinafter OIC Res.
34/38-POL]. The resolution expresses “the firm determination of Member States to continue
their effective cooperation and close consultations” to this end. Id. at 76, § 1.
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exclusively to so-called “divine religions”95 and categorically links
defamation with blasphemy by condemning “all blasphemous acts
against Islamic principles, symbols and sacred personalities” and “all
abhorrent and irresponsible statements about Islam and its sacred
personalities.”96
The resolution’s provisions notably omit any consideration of the
deleterious impact of existing anti-blasphemy measures in OIC
member states and elsewhere.97 But perhaps most starkly at odds with
the fanfare surrounding the UNHRC’s consensus on combating
incitement, the OIC resolution calls upon all states “to prevent any . . .
defamation of Islam by incorporating legal and administrative
measures which render defamation illegal and punishable by law.”98
Drawing on the OIC’s position in the UNHRC Ad Hoc Committee,
the resolution calls for “a legally binding international instrument to
prevent intolerance, discrimination, prejudice and hatred on the
grounds of religion, and defamation of religions . . . .”99
If the OIC’s commitment to advancing a prohibition on defamation
of religion still appears ambivalent or otherwise displaced by the
consensus vote at the UNHRC, Resolution 34/38-POL cements the
OIC’s position by establishing an annual reporting requirement
intended to cover “defamatory acts against Islam or its sacred
personalities.”100 And it maintains the defamation issue as an item
agenda for the 39th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers.101
Similarly, Resolution 35/38-POL, expressly addressing
“Combating Defamation of Religions” also reaffirms previous UN
resolutions on defamation of religion, and
[e]mphasiz[es] that the consistent pattern of safe passage of
the resolution, by a majority vote beyond OIC membership,
lends recognition and international legitimacy to the urgent
need to combat defamation of religions.102
To undergird this position, the OIC elsewhere calls for “the nonuse of the universality of human rights as a pretext to interfere in the
Id.
Id. § 5.
97 See infra Part IV.C (discussing numerous instances of anti-blasphemy laws being used
by OIC member states to infringe on freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief).
98 OIC Res. 34/38-POL, supra note 94, at 77, § 9.
99 Id. § 12 (quotations omitted). The resolution also established an “open-ended
Intergovernmental Group of Legal an[d] Political Experts to develop and examine the legal and
political elements of such an instrument.” Id. at 78, § 13.
100 Id. § 16.
101 Id. § 18.
102 OIC Res. No. 35/38-POL, supra note 11, at 79 (emphasis removed).
95
96
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states’ internal affairs and diminish their national sovereignty.”103
Together with this, the OIC also asserts that western states have a
responsibility to “ensure full respect to Islam and all divine religions”
and must reject the use of “freedom of expression or press as a pretext
to defame religions.”104 Arguably, these assertions may reflect no
more than rhetorical declarations. Resolution 35/38-POL, however,
also mandates very practical steps for advancing efforts to secure a
prohibition against defamation by, among other things, intensifying
efforts to coordinate positions and broaden the support base in favor
of defamation resolutions “including through . . . possibilities of
reciprocal arrangements with other groups and states.”105 The
resolution also recommends specific activities be undertaken by the
OIC Secretary General.106
This political and legal maneuvering in turn begs the question:
How does the OIC reconcile its business-as-usual marching orders
concerning an international prohibition on defamation of religion with
the consensus mandate espoused by Resolution 16/18 and celebrated
by government and NGO officials alike? To help answer this
question, the OIC’s 2011 resolutions provide two critical pieces of
information. First, the organization offers no more than a passing
acknowledgement of the so-called historic UNHRC resolution. And
even then, the reference is couched in classically tepid diplomatic
parlance that merely takes note of “the adoption by consensus of the
HRC resolution 16/18.”107 But beyond this lukewarm endorsement,
the OIC more tellingly “[u]rges all Member States to continue to
support the [defamation of religion] resolution on bloc . . . while
exploring alternative approaches, including the one contained in the
HRC resolution 16/18.”108 From this perspective, the resolution
103 OIC, On Follow Up and Coordination of Work On Human Rights, OIC Res. No. 1/38Leg, compiled in Resolutions on Legal Affairs, at 4, § 5, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/CFM38/2011/LEG/RES (June 28–30, 2011) [hereinafter OIC Res. No. 1/38-Leg]; see also OIC, On
Follow Up and Coordination of Work On Human Rights, OIC Res. No. 1/37-Leg, at 1, § 5,
compiled in Resolutions on Legal Affairs, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/CFM-37/2010/LEG/RES.FINAL
(May 18–20, 2010) [hereinafter OIC Res. No. 1/37-Leg] (emphasis removed) (“Calls for the
non-use of the universality of human rights as a pretext to interfere in the states’ internal affairs
and undermine their national sovereignty.”).
104 OIC Res. No. 1/38-Leg, supra note 103, at 4, § 8; see also id. at 5, § 10 (similarly
reaffirming “the need to pursue, as a matter of priority, a common policy aimed at preventing
defamation of Islam perpetrated under the pretext and justification of the freedom of expression
in particular through media and Internet”).
105 OIC Res. No. 35/38-POL, supra note 11, at 82, § 14.
106 Id. § 16.
107 Id. § 14. The preamble of this resolution “[r]eaffirm[s] the OIC sponsored resolutions
on combating defamation of religions adopted by the Human Rights Council and the United
Nations General Assembly” and then “[a]lso reaffirm[s] the OIC sponsored resolution 16/18.”
Id. at 79 (emphasis removed).
108 Id. at 82, § 15.
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ostensibly responsible for putting an end to “divisive debate” at the
UN is no more than a distraction, an alternative approach to securing
the OIC’s unaffected top priority—an international prohibition
against speech deemed critical or insulting of Islam, or at the very
least, international validation for the continued prosecution of
blasphemy offenses at home.
That this objective remains a “top priority” is confirmed not only
in the text of the OIC resolution on combating defamation of
religion,109 but also in the organization’s steadfast commitment to the
subject even in the face of seemingly more urgent matters. For
example, a survey of issues addressed at the OIC Annual
Coordination Meeting held in September 2011, and illustrated in the
below table, indicates that defamation of religion received more
consideration than developments in Libya, Afghanistan, Syria, and
Iraq combined.110 In fact, the only issue that garnered more attention
than defamation was the OIC’s perennial concern with the ArabIsraeli/Israeli-Palestinian conflict—an issue inextricably linked to the
organization’s establishment in 1969.111

109 Id.

§ 17.
Final Communique of the Annual Coordination Meeting of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of the OIC Member States, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/ACM-2011/FC (Sept. 26, 2011) [hereinafter
OIC, Final Communique].
111 Ishtiaq Ahmad, The Organization of the Islamic Conference: From Ceremonial Politics
Towards Politicization?, in BEYOND REGIONALISM?: REGIONAL COOPERATION, REGIONALISM
AND REGIONALIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 125, 125 (Cilja Harders & Matteo Legrenzi eds.,
2008).
110 OIC,
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Table: Issues Addressed by OIC Annual Coordination Meeting
Final Communiqué 2011
Rank
1

2
3
3
4
5
6
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

Issue
Arab-Israeli/Israeli-Palestinian
conflict
(express references only)
Defamation
of
religion,
Islamophobia, & incitement to
racial and religious hatred
Terrorism
UN reform (including OIC voting at
the UN relating expressly to, inter
112
alia, defamation of religion)
Nuclear
weapons/energy,
disarmament & non-proliferation
Jammu and Kashmir
Libya
Somalia
Kosovo
Azerbaijan
Cyprus
Iraq
Muslims in Greece
Sudan
Yemen
Djibouti
Afghanistan
Syrian crisis (Arab Spring)

Total # of Paragraphs
(Paragraph #s)
12 (¶¶ 5–11, 13–15, 45,
& 54)
10 (¶¶ 54–63)
6 (¶¶ 39–44)
6 (¶¶ 64–69)
5 (¶¶ 45–49)
4 (¶¶ 20–23)
4 (¶¶ 26–29)
2 (¶¶ 25 & 33)
2 (¶¶ 30–31)
1 (¶ 18)
1 (¶ 19)
1 (¶ 32)
1 (¶ 34)
1 (¶ 35)
1 (¶ 36)
1 (¶ 37)
1 (¶ 38)
1 (¶ 15)

This ranking indicates that UNHRC Resolution 16/18 failed to
persuade the OIC that defamation of religion needed to be shelved or
abandoned. An EU-sponsored review of the UNHRC that predates
adoption of Resolution 16/18 confirms that the OIC’s agenda
priorities remain unchanged, even in a “post-consensus” era.
112 See also OIC, On Coordination and Voting Patterns of Member States at the United
Nations and Other International and Multilateral Fora, Res. No. 41/37-POL, compiled in
Resolutions on Political Issues, at 99, § 5, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/CFM-37/2010/POL/RES//FINAL
(May 18–20, 2010) [hereinafter OIC Res. No. 41/37-POL] (emphasis added) (“Calls on Member
States to further enhance their [UN] cooperation and coordination, and adopt unified positions
and voting patterns . . . that advance the objectives and principles of the OIC and interests of the
Islamic world, including those that relate to combating Islamophobia, the defamation of
religions, and peaceful settlement of conflicts.”). The 2011 final communiqué “urge[s] Member
States to implement [this] Resolution . . . .” OIC, Final Communique, supra note 110, ¶ 67.
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According to the report, “[a]lmost all of the OIC resolutions in
regular sessions concern Israeli violations of human rights, or
defamation of religions.”113
In addition to illuminating the OIC’s top priorities, the 2011 Final
Communique is also instructive insofar as it confirms the OIC’s
framing of UNHRC Resolution 16/18 as merely a stepping-stone on
the path to an international prohibition of defamation of religion. The
Communique specifically lauds the OIC Groups in New York and
Geneva for placing the “crucial” issue of “incitement to racial and
religious hatred, in particular, its contemporary manifestation—i.e.
the defamation of religions, at the top of the permanent agenda of the
General Assembly and the HRC.”114 The statement then proceeds to:
(1) “emphasize[] the need to develop, at the United Nations, including
the Human Rights Council, a legally binding international instrument
to promote respect for all religions”;115 (2) “stress[] the need to
prevent the abuse of freedom of expression and freedom of press for
insulting Islam and other divine religions”;116 and finally (3) urge
Member States to implement OIC Resolution 41/37-POL,117 which
stated their commitment to vote as a bloc at the UN on OIC
objectives, “including those that relate to combating Islamophobia
[and] the defamation of religions . . . .”118
The significance of both the OIC drive in favor of bloc voting and
its impact on UN affairs is worth underscoring in the context of
Resolution 16/18 and any future action on the questions of incitement
and defamation. The EU’s 2011 report on the UNHRC observes that
“the Africa Group often seems to be working in conjunction with the
OIC—and frequently OIC members will speak on behalf of the Africa
Group. The OIC’s concerns have thus been dominating the HRC’s
discussions and outcomes.”119 As an outgrowth of the pervasiveness
of ‘bloc politics’ within the HRC, “moderate states in blocs opposing
the EU often find it more attractive to go along with the OIC or the
Africa Group or the NAM [Non Aligned Movement] than to resist the
peer pressure and vote with the EU.”120 More distressingly, the
113 The European Union and the Review of the Human Rights Council, EUR. PARL. DOC.
PE 433.870, at 13 (2011).
114 OIC, Final Communique, supra note 110, ¶ 54 (emphasis added).
115 Id. ¶ 59.
116 Id. ¶ 61.
117 Id. ¶ 67.
118 OIC Res. No. 41/37-POL, supra note 112, at 99, § 5.
119 EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 433.870, supra note 113, at 13. This phenomenon is confirmed by
the Africa Group’s position within the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee on Complementary
Standards. See supra Part I.B.
120 Id. at 15.
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pattern of response to this bloc voting has been colored by a
“prevailing view . . . that the EU should avoid ‘losing’ and therefore
should not run . . . resolutions that may not attract a consensus.”121 As
a consequence, the report finds that EU ambitions in the UNHRC
have been distinctly lowered. Rather than propose and pursue its own
resolutions,122 the EU approach is characterized by a shift away “quite
considerably from its initial position” in favor of “‘going for
consensus.’”123 Although this tactic may generate the appearance of
unanimity within the Council, it does little to address the report’s
underlying conclusion that consensus-seeking behavior may
ultimately harm “the cause of promoting and protecting human
rights.”124 In this respect, Resolution 16/18 and its outgrowth is a case
in point.
C. The Istanbul Process for Combating Intolerance and
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief: Anyone for Jenga?
On the heels of the 38th session of the OIC’s Council of Foreign
Ministers, the OIC and United States co-hosted in Istanbul, Turkey, a
high-level ministerial meeting intended to facilitate Resolution
16/18’s implementation. The event, which gathered representatives
from key states and international organizations, ended with a feeble
joint statement “call[ing] upon all relevant stakeholders throughout
the world to take seriously the call for action set forth in Resolution
16/18.”125 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton separately remarked:
[T]ogether we have begun to overcome the false divide that
pits religious sensitivities against freedom of expression, and
we are pursuing a new approach based on concrete steps to
fight intolerance wherever it occurs. Under [Resolution
16/18], the international community is taking a strong stand

121 Id.

at 12–13. The report also noted:

The EU’s isolation is evident in the voting records of the Human Rights Council.
While most resolutions in the HRC are approved by consensus, roll-call votes are
held on the most contentious issues. In the first fifteen regular sessions, there were a
total of 89 roll-call votes. In 64 of them (72%), EU member states were in the
minority.
Id. at 14.
122 Id. at 13.
123 Id. at 18.
124 Id.
125 Joint Statement on Combating Intolerance, Discrimination, and Violence Based on
Religion or Belief, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (Jul. 15, 2011),
http://www.oicun.org/oicus/oicusprojects/20110719041927244.html.
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for freedom of expression and worship, and against
discrimination and violence based upon religion or belief.126
To further advance this new approach, the United States
announced the “Istanbul Process,” a series of expert level meetings
intended to “operationalize[e] the text of HRC Resolution 16/18 . . .
[and] turn our energies to seeking real and effective measures against
bigotry, discrimination, and violence on the basis of religion or belief
in the ways spelled out in Resolution 16/18, which are fully consistent
with freedom of expression.”127
The first of these meetings was held behind closed doors over
three days in late December 2011 in Washington DC. The meeting
focused on the twin themes of identifying methods to better enforce
laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion or belief and
exploring government strategies to engage religious minorities,
including religious and cultural awareness training for government
officials.128 Although not in attendance, OIC Secretary General
Ihsanoglu sent a message to the meeting participants, reiterating
verbatim the remarks he offered several months earlier in Istanbul:
The importance of the consensual adoption of [Resolution
16/18] cannot be overemphasized. . . .
....
Let me say that it reaffirmed OIC’s credibility as well as
demonstrated ability to seek, promote and build consensus on
even the most sensitive of issues in contemporary
international relations. It clearly demonstrated that, as a
mature International Organization, OIC was not wedded to
either a particular title or the content of a resolution. We just
wanted to ensure that the actual matter of vital concern and
interest to OIC Member states was addressed.129

126 Clinton,
127 U.S.

supra note 9.
Dep’t of State, Resolution 16/18 December Expert Level Meeting, supra note 55,

at 2.
128 Cook, supra note 13; see also Agenda, Istanbul Process For Combating Intolerance and
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Dec. 12–14, 2011 (on file with the author).
129 OIC Secretary General, Message to the Washington Meeting on the Istanbul Process
(Dec.
14,
2011),
available
at
http://www.oicun.org/oicus/oicusprojects/20111215123907595.html. This message is a repeat
of the one offered at the outset of the ministerial meeting held in Istanbul on July 15, 2011. See
OIC, Statement of HE Prof. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, the OIC Secretary General, at the
Ministerial Meeting, held on 15 July 2011 at the IRCICA in Istanbul-Turkey (July 19, 2011),
www.oicun.org/oicus/oicusprojects/20110719042534728.html.
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It is difficult to reconcile this statement with those promulgated by
OIC representatives and others in the lead up to voting on Resolution
16/18. Yet more egregiously, when contextualized against the flurry
of OIC activity both internally and at the UN reasserting the
organization’s commitment to securing a prohibition against
perceived criticism and insult of religious ideas and beliefs, the
Secretary General’s assertion that the OIC is not wed to content
appears dubious at best.
For its part, the U.S. Department of State has announced its
intention to compile “a comprehensive report based on discussions
[from the December meetings] outlining a set of recommendations
and best practices to be submitted to the [OHCHR] for public
distribution.”130 But confronted with the OIC’s seemingly
contradictory positions, one must wonder what value such
recommendations will have in developing a genuinely consensual
vision for combating religious intolerance while upholding religious
freedom and freedom of expression. Indeed, the quest for concrete
implementation standards will likely prove to be a Jenga moment for
Resolution 16/18. By failing to decisively invalidate the chimera of
defamation of religion, the UN has allowed the OIC to advocate its
continued legality, including by openly asserting that implementation
of Resolution 16/18 is one possible “alternative approach” to
achieving the end goal of shielding religious beliefs from criticism
and insult. Against this backdrop, international negotiations aimed at
identifying implementation tools and practices will likely be subject
to significant pressure, particularly with respect to key terms
enshrined in Resolution 16/18.
Although international law does provide some guidance, such as
ICCPR Article 20, which suffers from underdeveloped consideration,
the ongoing activity of the UNHRC Ad Hoc Committee and the
OIC’s unaltered position signal the persistence of radically divergent
opinions. In this vein, discrepancies and nuances over parsing what
constitutes incitement, advocacy, discrimination, hostility, religious
hatred, denigration, negative religious stereotyping, and imminent
violence may generate three possible outcomes: (1) promulgated
international implementation standards that omit precise definitions
for key terms but retain consensus support; (2) a complete public
breakdown in negotiations or a contentious roll call vote on
implementation standards where consensus over specific terms cannot
be reached; or (3) the parties may opt in favor of death by committee,
130 U.S.

at 2.

Dep’t of State, Resolution 16/18 December Expert Level Meeting, supra note 55,
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where consensus over specific terms cannot be reached, resulting in
no public follow up by the UNHRC on implementation standards.
In the first scenario, national authorities are left to fill in the
blanks, allowing for operationalization of Resolution 16/18 that
facilitates subjective interpretation and measures that continue to
protect select religious beliefs at the expense of freedom of
expression and freedom of religion or belief. Here, the OIC will be
quick to point to its consistent understanding that while “human rights
are universal in nature,” any consideration must “bear[] in mind the
significance of national and regional particularities and various
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.”131 In the second case,
where negotiations suffer a public breakdown, the OIC’s hand is
similarly strengthened insofar as its member states are left free to
invoke both consensus Resolution 16/18 and previous defamation of
religion resolutions as valid bases for redoubling efforts intended to
prohibit defamation of religion. A roll call vote on implementation
standards likewise leaves Resolution 16/18 intact and, given the
current makeup of the UNHRC, seems unlikely to endorse any norms
that contradict OIC objectives. Under the third scenario, the parties
may, in the spirit of consensus, “agree to disagree” and in turn opt to
bury international implementation standards rather than spark another
“divisive debate.” That outcome would similarly empower national
authorities to superimpose a subjective interpretation on Resolution
16/18, including a linkage between it and previous defamation of
religion resolutions. This linkage, in turn, would ostensibly validate
domestic measures limiting perceived criticism or insult of select
religious beliefs as comporting with international law.
IV. MOVING FORWARD
In November 2011, the UN’s Third Committee approved a
consensus resolution mostly mirroring UNHRC Resolution 16/18.132
Human Rights First (“HRF”) called the Third Committee text “a
decisive break from the polarizing focus in the past on defamation of
religions.”133 Speaking after its adoption, the representative from the
131 OIC Res. No. 1/38-Leg, supra note 103, at 4, § 1; see also OIC Res. No 1/37-Leg,
supra note 103, at 1 (recognizing the importance of promoting human rights while taking into
account various historical and cultural backgrounds).
132 Social, Humanitarian & Cultural—Third Committee Res. 66/69(b), U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/66/L.47/Rev.1 (Nov. 11, 2011). One notable distinction requires the Secretary-General to
prepare “a report on steps taken by States to combat intolerance, negative stereotyping,
stigmatization, discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against persons, based on
religion or belief.” Id. at 5, § 10.
133 Press Release, Human Rights First, U.N. Third Committee Makes Decisive Break from
“Defamation of Religion” (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2011/11/15/u-n-
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United Arab Emirates (“UAE”), on behalf of the OIC, again
emphasized that the resolution was inexorably linked to prior
resolutions addressing defamation of religion.134 Alongside this, the
most recent issue of OIC Journal affirmed for its readers that
incitement to religious hatred and defamation of religion are
indistinguishable: “Resolution 16/18 signifies an alternative and
consensual approach towards dealing with the issue of ‘defamation of
religions’ or incitement to hatred on religious grounds with a view to
addressing vital concerns of all parties on this important issue.”135
Despite the OIC’s very public and consistent assertion that
defamation of religion remains valid and the organization’s express
intent to continue advocating its formal adoption, the UNGA moved
to adopt the Third Committee’s resolution one month later in
December 2011, again without a vote.136 In an effort to counter
“commonly expressed concerns”137 challenging the wisdom of the
UNGA vote and the unfolding Istanbul Process,138 HRF sought to

third-committee-makes-decisive-break-from-%E2%80%9Cdefamation-ofreligion%E2%80%9D/. HRF also heralded Resolution 16/18 as a fresh start which “charted a
new course” by focusing on the protection of the rights of individuals rather than the protection
of abstract ideas and religions. Press Release, Human Rights First, U.N. General Assembly
Urged to Combat Intolerance, Respect Free Expression (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2011/10/21/u-n-general-assembly-urged-to-combatintolerance-respect-free-expression/.
134 See Press Release, General Assembly, Third Committee, Text Recommending
Adoption of Protocol to Child Rights Convention Establishing Communications Procedure for
Individual Complaints Approved by Third Committee; 13 Other Texts Approved on Such Issues
as Combating Religious Intolerance, Disabilities Convention, Human Rights Learning, Human
Rights Council Report, U.N. Press Release GA/SHC/4029 (Nov. 15, 2011) (“[The consensus]
was a very positive development . . . which also complemented other General Assembly
resolutions.”).
135 ‘Istanbul Process’ Continues: UN Resolution 16/18 Sets on an Implementation
Framework in Washington, OIC J., Sept.–Dec. 2011, at 48, 48.
136 G.A. Res. 66/167, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/167 (Dec. 19, 2011); see also Press Release,
General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts More Than 60 Resolutions Recommended by
Third Committee, Including Text Condemning Grave, Systematic Human Rights Violations in
Syria, U.N. Press Release GA/11198 (Dec. 19, 2011) (announcing the adoption of the
resolution); Resolutions: 66th Session, GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/66/resolutions.shtml (last visited Mar. 2, 2012) (listing resolutions
adopted by the 66th session of the General Assembly).
137 See Joëlle Fiss, U.N. Tackles Religious Intolerance Without Limiting Free Speech,
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2011/12/20/the-u-s-isnot-opening-the-door-to-limiting-freedom-of-speech/ (responding to certain concerns over the
U.N. resolution on combating religious intolerance).
138 Conservative critics have most vocally raised these concerns. See, e.g., Soeren Kern,
U.S., E.U. Spearhead Islamic Bid to Criminalize Free Speech, STONEGATE INST. (Jan. 6, 2012,
5:00 AM), http://www.stonegateinstitute.org/2734/criminalize-free-speech (criticizing the
Obama administration for giving the OIC political legitimacy); Joseph Klein, The Obama
Administration’s Islamist Whitewashing Campaign, FRONTPAGEMAG.COM (Dec. 21, 2011),
http://frontpagemag.com/2011/12/21/the-obama-administrations-islamist-whitewashingcampaign/ (criticizing the Obama administration for submitting to the OIC’s wishes); Nina
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rebut several “myths” related to U.S. engagement with Muslim
states. One of these myths, according to HRF, posits that if “[t]he
OIC has not abandoned the concept of defamation of religions . . .
why bother organizing [the Istanbul Process] if its agenda hasn’t
changed?”139 Acknowledging that defamation of religion “has not
vanished into thin air” and that blasphemy laws “continue to abuse
human rights,” HRF downplayed the sustained effort to preserve
defamation of religion’s legitimacy by loosely observing that “[a]t
the international level . . . certain leaders have not abandoned
reference to defamation of religions.”140 This casual assessment
neglects the scope and consistency of the OIC’s multiple
statements and resolutions that followed on the heels of Resolution
16/18. Moreover, it recklessly ignores the immediate connection
that the OIC continues to draw between previous defamation of
religion resolutions and the consensus resolutions of 2011.
Ultimately, HRF’s “myth” and “reality” misses the point. While it
may be fair to question the practicality of dialogue, the larger concern
should be whether the Istanbul Process can realistically offer a
framework for progress given the potential for manipulation outlined
above, as well as the failure to decisively reject the defamation of
religion chimera. We ignore these shortcomings in the international
consensus at the peril of religious dissenters, religious minorities,
nonbelievers, artists, academics, journalists, and others who seek to
exercise their rights to free expression and freedom of religion in
accordance with existing international norms. It therefore behooves
governments and other communities concerned with the protection of
these rights to stop dutifully validating the consensus approach
without taking critical stock of the process to date. To facilitate this
undertaking, and in the context of the findings presented herein, the
author proposes some general suggestions below.
A. Resolve to Categorically Invalidate Defamation of Religion
Perhaps the single largest obstacle to genuine international
progress toward combatting intolerance is the UN’s failure to reject

Shea, A Perverse ‘Process’: Hillary’s Free-Speech Follies, N.Y. POST (Dec. 16, 2011, 10:15
PM) (calling on US diplomats to stop the “Istanbul Process”); see also Jonathan Turley,
Criminalizing Intolerance, Op-Ed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2011.
139 Fiss, supra note 137.
140 Id. Fiss goes on to suggest that “[t]his requires continued vigilance on the part of the US
and like-minded governments, as well as human rights and other civil society groups, to ensure
that the momentum remains on the side of the new consensus approach.” Id.
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decisively the concept of defamation of religion. This failure ensures
that the idea remains an albatross to any parallel or consensus
process. This is particularly true when certain states, most notably
OIC members, continue to invoke prior UN resolutions on this topic
unchallenged as valid normative standards for protecting select
religious beliefs. This overarching problem is exacerbated by the
decision to sidestep the stark confrontation over defamation of
religion in favor of an approach premised on inadequately defined
norms that provide a sufficiently vague platform for achieving
consensus. The new consensus approach has effectively shut down
the debate over an underlying and unresolved fundamental dispute.
And it has effectively moved the debate to an area where states are
poised to reformulate the same insidious practices under the guise of
the decidedly more admirable objective of combatting intolerance.
Pressing the international community to implement norms for
combatting intolerance under these circumstances potentially risks
accommodating the same goals sought by defamation of religion.
More troubling, the consensus approach complicates the task of
identifying problematic practices because it shifts the debate from one
characterized by distinct bright lines to a more nuanced and
subjective framework that leaves greater maneuvering room for
justifying discrimination and limitations of rights. This loss of clarity
is problematic not only from a rights perspective, but from an
engagement perspective as well. Saying that international law
prohibits protecting religious beliefs from insult is a more
straightforward proposition than saying international law rejects a
national legislature or judiciary’s interpretation of what constitutes
incitement, or for that matter, imminent violence. Thus, identifying
and countering instances of abusive implementation of measures
intended to combat intolerance becomes decidedly more complicated.
This potential fallout underscores why the Istanbul Process augurs
such little promise and in fact may further facilitate human rights
abuses.
To counteract this deleterious path, progress on the Istanbul
Process must be monitored closely. Discussions regarding the scope
of freedom of expression and other fundamental rights necessarily
dictate transparency.141 At a minimum, this requires opening future
proceedings to outside participation and scrutiny from NGOs,
journalists, academics and other concerned parties. Based on
141 Recall that the Washington DC round of the Istanbul Process was “closed-door.” Josef
Kuhn, ‘The Istanbul Process’: Hillary Clinton Hosts Summit on Religious Intolerance,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Dec.
15,
2011,
9:29
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/15/istanbul-process-clinton_n_1152508.html.
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whatever progress may be achieved for identifying means of
implementing Resolution 16/18 through the Istanbul Process, any
future UN resolution enshrining such norms should include operative
language clearly invalidating previous defamation of religion
resolutions as well as any other attempts to introduce similar norms
intended to shield religious beliefs from criticism.142 Admittedly, the
extent to which this is a feasible option is certainly open to debate.
Nevertheless, rejection of the defamation of religion concept must be
a prerequisite to any further advancement because it affords the only
authoritative means by which the specter of defamation of religion
can be prevented from contaminating genuine efforts aimed at
combatting incitement.143 To this end, there are several steps that can
be taken that build on earlier successes in lowering the numerical
majority voting in favor of defamation of religion resolutions.
B. Assertive Engagement on Constitutional and Legislative Reform
The Arab Spring revolutions can figure prominently in engaging
individual OIC member states. While many of these new
governments are emerging as decidedly Islamic in orientation, they
are also entering a world where human rights commitments are
increasingly important. Any extension of diplomatic and political
support and recognition, trade benefits, and aid (in the form of
financial and other assistance) should require the endorsement and
adoption of international human rights standards, not only in new
constitutions, but also in legislative reform that the post-revolution
era necessitates. Therefore, in addition to monitoring constitutional
and legislative change in countries in transition, the international
community should create opportunities for concrete engagement,
particularly regarding how these new governments intend to address
the challenge of combatting intolerance, as well as enshrine and
uphold international human rights.
142 As this Article goes to press, no progress on agreed implementation norms has been
made. Instead, the UNHRC’s nineteenth session in March 2012 approved by consensus a
resolution on combating intolerance that reiterates almost verbatim Resolution 16/18, without
any supplemental reference to implementation. Human Rights Council Res. 19/…, Combating
Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and Stigmatization of, and Discrimination, Incitement to
Violence and Violence Against, Persons Based on Religion or Belief, 19th Sess., Mar. 23, 2012,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/L.7 (Mar. 16, 2012).
143 There is at least one precedent at the UN concerning revocation of previous resolutions.
Consider the 1991 UNGA decision to cancel its infamous Resolution 3379 from sixteen years
earlier, which purported to brand Zionism a form of racism and racial discrimination. The oneline resolution simply provided that the UNGA “[d]ecides to revoke the determination
contained in its resolution 3379 (XXX) of 10 November 1975.” G.A. Res. 46/86, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/46/86 (Dec. 16, 1991). Arguably, a more explicit rejection of the defamation of religion
norm that provides additional context and justification could be negotiated.
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International recognition of these new governments and
endorsements of legitimacy should not be extended as a matter of
course. A useful starting point is the EU’s decision to condition
diplomatic recognition of post-Soviet states inter alia on the provision
of legal “guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and
minorities”144 Yet, already the international community appears
poised to place inadequate emphasis on the importance of
concretizing rights in emerging constitutional texts.145 For example,
Libya’s Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional Stage,
provides that “Islam is the Religion of the State and the principal
source of legislation is Islamic Jurisprudence (Sharia).”146 While the
maintenance of an established state religion is not per se incompatible
with international human rights law, such official recognition must
not result in any impairment of recognized rights, ‘‘nor in any
discrimination against adherents to other religions or nonbelievers.”147 With this in mind, the text fails to elaborate on key
questions including whose interpretation of sharia shall govern during
the transitional period, to whom shall sharia be applied, or what will
occur in the event of conflicts between sharia and international law.
To this end, Article 7, which provides that “[h]uman rights and his
basic freedoms shall be respected . . . . [and that] [t]he state shall
endeavor to join the international and regional declarations and
charters which protect such rights and freedoms,”148 leaves significant
room for improvement.
Similarly, statements of western officials do not go far enough in
establishing a minimum expectation for enshrining international
144 European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States, 31 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1485, 1487 (1992).
145 One comparative constitutional scholar recently writing about the unfolding drafting
process omitted any mention of an international role in the process or the importance of
incorporating strong protection for fundamental human rights. Tom Ginsburg, Libya’s New
Constitution: Lessons from Iraq’s Missteps, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2011. Earlier observations by
Ginsburg gloss over the issue of rights and focus instead on governance structure. See Tom
Ginsburg,
Thoughts
on
the
Draft
Transitional
Constitution
for
Libya,
CONSTITUTIONMAKING.ORG
(Aug.
21,
2011,
9:23
AM),
http://www.comparativeconstitutions.org/2011/08/thoughts-on-draft-transitional.html
(discussing the importance of governance structure); see also Catherine Ashton, EU High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Sec’y Policy and Vice President of the European
Comm’n, Speech at the Libya Women’s Rights Forum (Nov. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/fr/article_11579_fr.htm (emphasizing the importance of
political rights for women).
146 The Transitional Nat’l Council of Libya, Draft Constitutional Charter for the
Transitional Stage, AL-BAB.COM, art. 1, http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/libya/Libya-DraftConstitutional-Charter-for-the-Transitional-Stage.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
147 Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 22: Article 18: The Right to Freedom of
Thought, Conscience and Religion, ¶ 9, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (Jul. 30, 1993).
148 Draft Constitutional Charter, supra note 146, at art. 7.
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human rights norms in emerging constitutions and state practice. For
example, in July 2011 Secretary of State Clinton said, “In Egypt and
Tunisia, we hope to see minorities brought into the process of drafting
a new constitution and given a seat at the table as new democracies
take shape.”149 This timid stance is meager support for those favoring
reforms in line with international human rights norms, and does
precious little to motivate other relevant actors to forgo advocacy of
illegitimate limits on freedom of expression, including support for a
prohibition on “defamation of religions”.150 Indeed, several months
later, Egypt’s constitution drafting committee is in disarray, faced
with charges that some Islamists have sought to hamper the voices of
more moderate Egyptian Muslims, Coptic Christians, and secularists,
among others. Following a walkout by over 20 committee delegates
representative of these minority groups, an administrative court
moved to suspend the 100-member committee pending a review of
the process surrounding its formation.151
Building on the EU’s post-Cold War approach, therefore, the
international community should be prepared to “up the ante”. It must
develop a diplomatic strategy that moves beyond previously accepted
constraints on engagement in a transparent and straightforward
manner. As recent case studies, Afghanistan and Iraq offer scant
evidence to support perpetuating the “hands off” approach that
prevailed in those constitutional drafting experiences.152 Nevertheless,
149 Clinton,

supra note 9.
Tunisia: Affirm Human Rights in New Constitution, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct.
20, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/19/tunisia-affirm-human-rights-new-constitution
(noting that a questionnaire that surveyed Tunisian political parties found that those parties
“disagree on limits to freedom of expression when it concerns the right to privacy, the
protection of minorities against hate speech, and the “‘defamation of religions’”).
151 Bradley Hope, Egyptian constitution committee suspended, THE NATIONAL (Abu
Dhabi), Apr 11, 2012, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/egyptian-constitutioncommittee-suspended. See also Zvi Bar’el, Muslim Brotherhood suffers blow as Egypt court
anulls constitutional panel HA’ARETZ, Apr. 11, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/middleeast/muslim-brotherhood-suffers-blow-as-egypt-court-anulls-constitutional-panel-1.423595.
152 On Afghanistan, see for example United States Commission on International Religious
Freedom, Afghanistan: Draft Constitution Could Codify Repression, Apr. 17, 2003,
http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1477 (observing “There
is no clear evidence that the United States has been sufficiently involved in [Afghanistan’s]
constitution-drafting process to ensure that universal human rights are guaranteed. Through a
contractor, U.S. assistance has concentrated on providing technical and logistical support for the
drafting committee and assistance in the public consultation process.”), Mir Hermatullah Sadat,
The Implementation of Constitutional Human Rights in Afghanistan, HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 11,
no.
2
(2004):
48–50,
back
page,
available
at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/11/3sadat.pdf?rd=1 (noting that “the international
community and the UN have been generally ineffective in promoting human rights in
Afghanistan. The UN has been non-committal because its main agency, United Nations
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), wants to maintain a ‘light footprint’ presence in
Afghanistan”), and Cornelia Schneider, The International Community and Afghanistan’s
Constitution, 7 PEACE, CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL (July
150 See
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some experts continue to endorse precisely this approach, calling for
limiting engagement on constitution drafting to generic efforts such as
“communicat[ing] that rule of law works” and “offer[ing] fair
technical help.”153 A new international strategy should draw a
principled and valid distinction between the dubious imposition of a
constitution on a sovereign state and the legitimate active and
assertive promotion of the inclusion of strong, internationally
recognized human rights safeguards in any new constitutional text.
The international community can use a range of diplomatic,
development, trade, and even military assistance incentives to this
end, including direct support for those political associations that favor
adopting international human rights norms as part of their political
platforms. Admittedly, a positive outcome for this more aggressive
engagement effort is by no means assured. This reality is underscored
by the decision of Egyptian authorities to prosecute a number of
prominent quasi-NGOs154 working in the rule of law and democracybuilding sectors for funding and supporting anti-government
protests.155 Nevertheless, supporting such efforts and reinforcing them
with parallel, meaningful backup by concerned governments will at
least facilitate the exposure of fault lines where they may exist, thus

2005), 174, 187, available at http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk (noting that Barnett R.
Rubin, a prominent consultant to Afghanistan’s Constitutional Drafting Commission, “in his
presentations to the Commission…appeared to be treading very carefully so as not to be
perceived as interfering with the process. He made a few general suggestions…”). On Iraq, see
for example J Alexander Their, Writing Iraq’s constitution a chance to change history, SAN
FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE,
Feb.
25,
2005,
B–9,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/02/25/EDGJJBG1IT1.DTL&ao=all (making no mention of a role for
international norms or human rights in Iraq’s new constitution), and Constitution Fight in Iraq,
PBS Newshour, Aug. 29, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/julydec05/iraq_8-29.html (according to Spence Spencer, Washington director of the Public
International Law and Policy Group, “I can speak from my own experience [in Iraq] that we
were very strongly cautioned to make sure that the technical assistance that we provided was
good and technical only and to leave the drafting and the decision-making to the Iraqis
themselves.”)
153 Nathan J. Brown, Americans, Put Away Your Quills, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INT’L PEACE (Nov. 8, 2011), http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=45951. See also
Ginsburg, supra note 145.
154 These groups include the U.S. based International Republican Institute (“IRI”) and
National Democratic Institute (“NDI”), and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation based in
Germany. According to the IRI, criminal prosecution of its staff represents “a politically
motivated effort to squash Egypt’s growing civil society groups, orchestrated through the courts,
in part by Mubarak-era hold overs.” IRI Statement on Rumored Prosecution of Americans in
Egypt, INT’L REPUBLICAN INST. (Feb. 5, 2012), http://www.iri.org/news-events-presscenter/news/iri-statement-rumored-prosecution-americans-egypt.
155 See Scott Shane & Ron Nixon, Charges Against U.S.-Aided Groups Come with History
of Distrust in Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012, at A6 (discussing Egypt’s prosecution of
nonprofit organizations).
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clarifying to what extent emerging governments are genuinely
prepared to adopt and abide by international norms.
C. Redouble Diplomacy: Identifying State Practices Inconsistent with
Consensus Resolution 16/18 and the Ongoing Problem with
Blasphemy Prosecutions
Concerned parties should redouble their public and private
diplomatic initiatives targeting states that have previously abstained
from or voted in favor of defamation of religion resolutions.
Informational outreach campaigns should identify state practices
inconsistent with Resolution 16/18 norms as well as the ongoing
deleterious impact associated with prosecution of blasphemy or
defamation of religion offenses. These outreach efforts can also
incorporate examples of best practices that highlight protection of
religious freedom while simultaneously upholding freedom of
expression.156 Developing these examples can help concretize the
risks associated with condoning a loose interpretation of standards
and norms associated with combating intolerance or authorizing an
international norm upholding defamation of religion.
Despite the 2011 consensus, a meaningful reduction in subjective
and discriminatory prosecutions of expression premised on protecting
religious beliefs is difficult to discern. For example, consider the
Tunisian government’s decision to prosecute Nabil Karoui, the
director of satellite broadcaster Nessma TV, for airing Persepolis, an
animated film that includes a brief representation of god as imagined
from a child’s point of view.157 Under the press and criminal codes of
l’ancien regime, Karoui has been charged with insulting a recognized
religion158 and harming public order and good morals159—offenses
that carry a maximum jail term of between two to five years. Several
days after the film’s screening, which apparently attracted only 1
percent of the TV-viewing audience160 but was nevertheless described
by some as a provocation,161 suspected “Salafist activists” allegedly
156 Some

of examples of steps that can be taken to this end are discussed in Part IV.D infra.
Franco-Iranian production directed by graphic novelist Marjane Satrapi
contemplates the 1979 Islamic revolution and rule of Ayatollah Khomeini through the eyes of a
young girl.
158 Art. 48, Republique Tunisienne, CODE DE LA PRESSE, Imprimerie Officielle de la
République Tunisenne, 2010.
159 Art. 121(3), Republique Tunisienne, LE CODE PENAL, Imprimerie Officielle de la
République Tunisenne, 2011.
160 Thierry Brésillon, Tunisie: Nessma TV, Symbole Ambigu pour un Procès Test, RUE 89
(Jan. 23, 2012, 7:25 AM), http://blogs.rue89.com/tunisie-libre/2012/01/23/tunisie-nessma-tvsymbole-ambigu-pour-un-proces-test-226346.
161 See Anthony Shadid, Tunisia Faces a Balancing Act of Democracy and Religion, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2012, at A1 (describing Salafist activists viewing the film as a provocation).
157 The
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firebombed Karoui’s home.162 The trial itself has been postponed
from November 2011 to January 2012, and most recently was
rescheduled to April 2012. On the street outside a Tunis courthouse
during the January hearing, a “group of bearded young radicals
shouted[,] ‘The people want Nessma closed down’ and ‘You, media
cowards, know that religion mustn’t be defamed.’”163 Although not
known for antagonizing deposed President Ben Ali, Karoui has
argued the case is “a test for freedom of expression and democracy in
Tunisia.”164
L’affaire Persepolis, as it has come to be known, illustrates the
risks associated with enforcing offenses based on insult to religion or
vague terms open to subjective enforcement. In a country that Human
Rights Watch labeled “best placed to move forward”165 among the
states undergoing Arab Spring revolutions, the prosecution may also
signal a potential rollback of (admittedly select) rights from the
previous regime. Ironically, the previous regime authorized screening
of the film in Tunisian theaters, and even contributed towards funding
a Tunisian dialect translation for local audiences.166 While Human
Rights Watch describes Tunisia’s new Press Code—drafted after the
revolution but not yet in force—as “significantly more liberal,” the
legislation maintains defaming state-recognized religions as a
criminal offense,167 an approach that, on its face, stands at odds with
the 2011 consensus.
Egypt also augurs poorly as a bellwether for compliance with the
UNHRC’s 2011 consensus resolution. In one incident, billionaire
Egyptian Coptic Naguib Sawiris tweeted a caricature of Mickey
Mouse with a beard and Minnie Mouse in what was interpreted to be
conservative Islamic garb. Instead of the Walt Disney Company suing
162 Tunisia Must Drop Charges Against TV Boss over ‘Persepolis’ Screening, AMNESTY
INT’L (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.amnesty.org/fr/node/29264.
163 Trial
of Tunisian TV Chief Who Aired ‘Persepolis’ Postponed, FR. 24,
http://www.france24.com/en/20120123-trial-tunisian-television-chief-postponed-nessma-tvnabil-karoui-persepolis-april-19-adjourned (last updated Jan. 23, 2012).
164 Le Procès de L’affaire Persepolis Reprend à Tunis, LA NOUVELLE TRIB. (Jan. 23,
2012), http://www.lnt.ma/actualites/le-proces-de-laffaire-persepolis-reprend-a-tunis-23815.html
(“[C]e sera un test pour la liberté d’expression et la démocratie en Tunisie.”).
165 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012: EVENTS OF 2011, at 10 (2012).
166 Ulysse Gosset, Nébil Karoui: “En Tunisie, Je Suis Dans la Peau de Salman Rushdie”,
L’EXPRESS (Jan. 23, 2012, 3:13 PM), http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/nebilkaroui-en-tunisie-je-suis-dans-la-peau-de-salman-rushdie_1074321.html.
167 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 165, at 636. In another recent case, a Tunisian
court sentenced two individuals (one in absentia) to seven years in prison “for violation of
morality, and disturbing public order” after they posted depictions of a naked prophet
Mohammed to Facebook. Tarek Amara, Tunisians jailed for Facebook cartoons of Prophet,
REUTERS, Apr. 5, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/us-tunisia-facebookidUSBRE8341FO20120405.
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for copyright infringement, he was hauled before Egypt’s chief
prosecutor and two separate charges of defamation of Islam were
filed against him.168 Although the courts did not address the
legitimacy of a criminal offense grounded in protecting select
religious beliefs from perceived insult, both charges were dismissed
for lack of standing.169 Other defendants have been less fortunate. In
February 2012, an Egyptian criminal court convicted septuagenarian
comic actor Adel Imam for “defaming Islam” based on his role in a
2007 film.170 In another defamation case, an Egyptian juvenile court
sentenced a 17-year-old Christian student, Gamal Abdou Massoud, to
a three-year jail term “after he insulted Islam and published and
distributed pictures that insulted Islam and its Prophet.”171
In Indonesia, another state that voted in favor of the consensus
resolution of 2011, the Constitutional Court “upheld the country’s
[1965] anti-blasphemy law . . . which imposes criminal penalties of
up to five years’ imprisonment on individuals who deviate from the
basic teachings of the official religions.”172 As the Special Rapporteur
on Religious Freedom observed, this ruling evidenced “resistance to
abandoning the criminalization of blasphemy or to repealing
discriminatory provisions that purport to combat ‘defamation of
religions.’”173
The provision continues to be enforced, even in a post-consensus
era. Most recently, police arrested an Indonesian civil servant for
creating a Facebook page in support of atheism.174 After being held in
detention for over two months, Alexander Aan was indicted in April
168 Egypt Businessman Naguib Sawiris Faces Blasphemy Trial, BBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16473759.
169 Egypt court dismisses Sawiris insulting Islam case, BBC NEWS, Feb. 28, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17192283; Court dismisses Islam insult
case
against
tycoon
Sawiris,
EGYPT
INDEPENDENT,
Mar.
3,
2012,
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/court-dismisses-islam-insult-case-against-tycoonsawiris.
170 Adel Imam is Sentenced to Jail over Islam Insult, BBC NEWS (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-16858553. The actor was sentenced to three
months and his appeal is still before the court. Adel Imam’s appeal against contempt of religion
jail
sentence
adjourned,
EGYPT
INDEPENDENT
(Apr.
4,
2012),
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/adel-imams-appeal-against-contempt-religion-jailsentence-adjourned.
171 Egypt sends Christian student to jail for insulting Islam, REUTERS, Apr. 4, 2012,
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE83309420120404.
172 Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Interim Report on Elimination of
all Forms of Religious Intolerance, transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, ¶ 44, n.42,
UN Doc. A/65/207 (Jul. 29, 2010) (by Asma Jahangir).
173 Id. ¶ 44.
174 Syofiardi Bachyul Jb, Atheist Civil Servant Arrested for Blasphemy, JAKARTA POST
(Jan. 20, 2012, 6:02 PM), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/01/20/atheist-civil-servantarrested-blasphemy.html.

4/19/2012 1:07:08 PM

2011]

DEFAMATION OF RELIGION

389

2012 under Criminal Code articles 156a(a) and 156a(b)175 for
allegedly deliberately expressing feelings “which principally have the
character of being at enimity [sic] with, abusing or staining a religion,
adhered to in Indonesia” and intentionally “prevent[ing] a person to
adhere to any religion based on the belief of the allmighty [sic]
God.”176 The offense carries a maximum imprisonment term of five
years.
The climate for religious intolerance in Indonesia is particularly
problematic for atheists, among others,177 given that the republic’s
constitution provides that the “State shall be based upon the belief in
the One and Only God.”178 As the United States Department of State
bluntly observed, the Indonesian “government does not allow for not
believing in God.”179 Plainly, this constitutional mandate appears at
odds with the 2011 UN consensus calling on states to “foster religious
freedom and pluralism by promoting the ability of members of all
religious communities to manifest their religion, and to contribute
openly and on an equal footing to society.”180 The provision instead
indicates an approach based on the desire to punish expression that is
perceived as critical, insulting or even disbelieving of religion.
Individuals critical of Islam fare no better in the Palestinian
Authority (“PA”) governed West Bank, where international donors
play a central role in the development of Palestinian state institutions.
PA forces arrested Waleed Al-Husseini after a sting operation
identified him as responsible for Facebook and blog postings
allegedly defaming Islam.181 Security sources maintained it was
impossible to release Al-Husseini, a Muslim who had renounced his
faith in favor of atheism, “because [they were] afraid he w[ould] be
killed by his family.”182 Ultimately, Al-Husseini was given a three175 Atheist faces three counts in court, THE JAKARTA POST,
Apr. 2, 2012,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/04/02/atheist-faces-three-counts-court.html.
176 PENAL
CODE
OF
INDON.
arts.
156–56(a),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ffbcee24.html.
177 Indonesia’s “Ministry of Religious Affairs extends official status to six religious
groups: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism.” U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT: INDON. 4 (July–December
2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171653.pdf. The criminal code
includes provisions that forbid “staining a religion” and preventing “a person to adhere to any
religion based on the belief of the almighty God.” INDON. PENAL CODE art. 156(a)(a–b).
179 INDON. CONST. art. 29(1).
179 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 177, at 4.
180 Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, supra note 7, at 3, § 6(b).
181 Palestinian Jailed for Logging on to Facebook as ‘God’ to Criticize Islam,
HAARETZ.COM
(Nov.
12,
2010,
10:00
AM),
http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/palestinian-jailed-for-logging-on-to-facebook-asgod-to-criticize-islam-1.324302.
182 ‘Atheist’ Palestinian Jailed ‘for His Own Safety’, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Dec. 7,
2010),
http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-technology/atheist-palestinian-jailed-for-his-
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year suspended sentence after being detained for a total of nine
months, much of which was spent in jail without charge.183 Since his
release, security agents have on several occasions arrested and
allegedly beaten Al-Husseini with cables, destroyed his two
computers, and “demanded that he stop expressing his views.”184
Another man from the same West Bank city of Qalqilya faces a
similar charge after being arrested by police following an altercation
with his father. According to the police report, “the father called
police to break up the fight after his son ‘cursed God.’”185 When
asked about the case, Qalqilya’s deputy police chief asserted that
police would target anyone who “curses God or any prophets or
religions.”186
The Palestinian Authority is still not a voting member of the UN
and admittedly did not have a say in the 2011 consensus vote. But
police officials volunteering this type of “mission statement” is
particularly troubling considering the ongoing role played by
international actors including the United States in funding and
training Palestinian police forces in subjects that include the rule of
law and human rights.187 Indeed, this approach to law enforcement
seems more at home in Saudi Arabia, where Hamza Kashgari recently
fled for his life after tweeting that he would not bow to Mohammed
but rather shake hands “as equals do.”188 The views expressed by the
twenty-three-year-old prompted Saudi Sheikh Nasser Al Omar to
break down in tears while pleading, between sobs, for the Saudi king

own-safety-20101207-18n2p.html.
183 Diaa Hadid, Activists: Climate of Intolerance in West Bank, WASHINGTON TIMES (Jan.
29, 2012), http://p.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/29/activists-climate-intolerance-westbank/.
184 Id.
185 Man Arrested for ‘Cursing God’, MA’AN NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 18, 2011, 9:41 AM),
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=437590.
186 Id. (quotations omitted).
187 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-505, PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: U.S.
ASSISTANCE IS TRAINING AND EQUIPPING SECURITY FORCES, BUT THE PROGRAM NEEDS TO
MEASURE PROGRESS AND FACES LOGISTICAL CONSTRAINTS 17, 45 (2010). See also Rule of
Law Section, EU CO-ORDINATING OFFICE FOR PALESTINIAN POLICE SUPPORT,
http://www.eupolcopps.eu/content/rule-law-section (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (describing an
EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories); PCP and EUPOL COPPS Deliver Pilot
Human Rights Training, EU CO-ORDINATING OFFICE FOR PALESTINIAN POLICE SUPPORT (July
9, 2011), http://www.eupolcopps.eu/content/pcp-and-eupol-copps-deliver-pilot-human-rightstraining (describing a training mission undertaken by the EU Police Mission).
188 Priyanka Boghani, Hamza Kashgari, Saudi Writer, Arrested in Malaysia for Offensive
Tweet,
GLOBAL
POST
(Feb.
10,
2012,
11:23
AM),
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/saudi-arabia/120210/hamzakashgari-saudi-writer-arrested-malaysia.
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to arrest Kashgari and charge him with apostasy.189 Kashgari’s shortlived effort to flee the Saudi kingdom ended when he was detained
and promptly deported from Malaysia “for allegedly insulting Islam
and the Prophet Muhammad.”190 As this Article goes to press,
Kashgari remains in a prison in the capital, Riyadh, “with no official
word on if and when he will stand trial.”191
Coupled with ongoing subjective and discriminatory prosecutions
of expression premised on protecting religious beliefs, certain states
continue to proffer distortive assessments of the extent to which their
legal regimes comport with international human rights standards.
These inconsistencies should receive more active and critical
attention, particularly where states purport to faithfully abide by
international norms. Examples of selective rendering of human rights
compliance abound, particularly in the area of protecting freedom of
religion and belief. For example, in a report submitted to the UN
Secretary General, Pakistan reiterated its view that “the ways and
means of addressing the issues of defamation and discrimination
based on religion and belief” should be strengthened and
diversified.192 To this end, Pakistan highlighted steps taken to
promote interfaith harmony and to combat vilification of religions,
including the use of “Sections 295, 295–A, 296, 297 and 298 of the
Pakistan Penal Code.”193
189 J. David Goodman, In Morocco and Saudi Arabia, Limits Seen to Speech on Social
Media, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2012, 2:08 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/09/inmorocco-and-saudi-arabia-limits-seen-to-speech-on-socialmedia/?scp=1&sq=Hamza%20Kashgari&st=cse.
190 Boghani, supra note 188 (quotations omitted). See also Saudi Detained in Malaysia for
Insulting
Prophet
Tweet,
BBC
NEWS
(Feb.
10,
2012,
3:22
AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16977903.
191 Ellen Knickmeyer, Saudi Youth Fear Crackdown After Friend’s Arrest, WALL ST.
JOURNAL, Apr. 7, 2012, A7. Other Twitter users are finding their tweets subject to similar
scrutiny. Kuwaiti authorities arrested Hamad al-Naqi in March 2012 for allegedly “defaming the
Islamic faith and the Prophet, his companions and his wife.” Ahmed Hagagy and Sylvia
Westall, Kuwaiti denies insulting Prophet on Twitter - lawyer, REUTERS, Apr. 3, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/03/kuwait-twitter-idUSL6E8F30J420120403. In the
wake of this arrest, Kuwaiti lawmakers have voted in favor of increasing the legal penalty from
a jail term to death for insulting God and the prophet Mohammed. “Members of parliament
must vote on the proposal again in a second session and it would need the approval of the
country’s ruler before becoming law.” Parliament votes for death penalty in blasphemy cases,
IRISH
TIMES,
Apr.
13,
2012,
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2012/0413/1224314681842.html. For another
potential emerging case, see also Another Twitter user accused of apostasy, EMIRATES 24/7,
Mar. 25, 2012, http://www.emirates247.com/news/region/another-twitter-user-accused-ofapostasy-2012-03-25-1.450274 (noting outcry among Saudi Twitter users calling for arrest of
Mohammed Salama for posting allegedly blasphemous statements concerning Islam).
192 U.N. Secretary-General, Combating Defamation of Religions: Rep. of the SecretaryGeneral, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. A/66/372 (Sept. 23, 2011) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General,
Combating Defamation].
193 Id.
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What Pakistani authorities omit from this rose-colored portrayal of
religious freedom is the fact that the penal code continues to serve as
the wellspring for justifying intolerance and persecution of religious
minorities. In addition to its selective enforcement, the penal code
provides for, among other things, wildly disproportionate penalties
when the religion criticized is Islam,194 the absence of any mens rea
requirement for “directly or indirectly, defil[ing] the sacred name of
the Holy Prophet Muhammad” or other Muslim “holy personages,”195
and the criminalization of elements of the Ahmadi faith.196
Not to be outdone, Qatar reported to the UN Secretary General:
. . . that its society is governed by moral, social, religious and
cultural values that promote equality and prohibit
discrimination . . . . These values are inspired by the Islamic
faith and reflected in the Constitution and relevant legislation
. . . . The State is striving to become a model of peaceful
coexistence between different faiths . . . and ensuring respect
for religious freedoms.197
Remarkably in the same report, Qatar cited provisions from its
Criminal Code as an example of its comportment with international
standards.198 But from an international human rights perspective,
these provisions on their face embody precisely the kinds of norms
that operate to violate the principles of equality, discrimination, and
freedom of religion or belief. Under Qatari law, an individual is
subject to:
up to seven years’ imprisonment for denigrating or insulting
the deity by any means; making insulting, disparaging or
blasphemous remarks about the Koran; making insulting
remarks about Islam or an Islamic ritual; defaming any of the
revealed religions; insulting the prophet of a religion; or
desecrating a place of worship of a revealed religion or any
object found in that place.199
194 Compare PAK. PENAL CODE art. 295–B (providing a punishment of imprisonment for
life for “wilfully defil[ing], damag[ing] or desecrat[ing] a copy of the Holy Qur’an”) and PAK.
PENAL CODE, art. 295–C (providing for the punishment of death or life imprisonment for the use
of derogatory remarks concerning the Holy Prophet Muhammad), with PAK. PENAL CODE art.
295, 295(a) (providing for less severe penalties for offenses against other religions).
195 PAK. PENAL CODE art. 295–C, 298–A.
196 PAK. PENAL CODE art. 298–B–C.
197 U.N. Secretary-General, Combating Defamation, supra note 192, ¶ 58.
198 Id. ¶ 60.
199 Id. ¶ 60. The term “revealed religions” typically includes only Islam, Judaism and
Christianity. For a longer discussion of how this term has been employed by the OIC and others,
see Blitt, supra note 4, at 156–159.
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The selective and distortive interpretation of human rights law
illustrated in these examples sheds light on the unlikely durability of
the 2011 consensus insofar as these state practices betray a disconnect
between Resolution 16/18 and the willingness to abandon criminal
prosecution of individuals who are perceived to insult or criticize
certain protected religious views. Accordingly, such laws should be
utilized as a tangible departure point for renewed diplomatic
engagement to encourage states to take another look at the risks
associated with condoning a loose interpretation of standards and
norms associated with combating intolerance or upholding
defamation of religion. This dialogue should prompt some hard
questions. For example, Should we rethink celebrating an
international “consensus” on combating intolerance where certain
state practices operate in direct opposition to it? Moreover, given the
linkage between incitement and defamation espoused by certain
states, should implementation measures around Resolution 16/18
reasonably proceed without first clearly precluding the lawfulness of
defamation of religion? Based on the outcome of these dialogues, a
sharper sense of Resolution 16/18’s viability should emerge,
including whether a return to the more fundamental and still
unresolved debate over the legitimacy of defamation of religion may
be necessary.
D. Fight Intolerance at Home
The United States and others should take concrete measures to
address the more egregious instances of state-sanctioned or tolerated
discrimination, particularly as it may relate to profiling, dress codes
and other measures that may impinge on religious freedom. Further,
the government and other community leaders should take a more
proactive approach to unequivocally denounce “grassroots” and statebased initiatives that feed and breed xenophobia.200
In a number of recent incidents “internal” public diplomacy could
have done more to educate and avert potentially discriminatory state
action. For example, in Tennessee, state legislators attempted to brand
200 Other examples beyond the United States come to mind, such as the Swiss ban on
minarets, also approved by public referendum. To date, the European Court of Human Rights
has declared two petitions on this issue inadmissible because the plaintiffs lacked standing as
victims. Petitioners in both cases had neither sought nor been denied authorization by the Swiss
authorities to construct a minaret. See Press Release, Registrar of the European Court of Human
Rights, Prohibition on Building Minarets in Switzerland: Applications Inadmissible (Jul. 8,
2011),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=open&documentId=887994&portal=hbkm&s
ource=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.
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any organization that endorses sharia as a terrorist group. The wildly
xenophobic draft bill asserted, among other things, that:
[K]nowing adherence to sharia and to foreign sharia
authorities is prima facie evidence of an act in support of the
overthrow of the United States government and the
government of this state through the abrogation, destruction,
or violation of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions
by the likely use of imminent criminal violence and terrorism
with the aim of imposing sharia on the people of this state.201
Ultimately, in the face of public outcry and media attention, the final
bill as passed erased any mention of sharia.202
In another widely publicized instance from 2010, Oklahoma voters
were presented with a referendum question that ostensibly sought to
“Save Our State”203 by ostracizing a single religion for discriminatory
treatment at the hands of the government.204 Seventy percent of voters
endorsed the constitutional amendment which proposed expressly
“forbid[ding] courts from considering or using international law . . . .
[or] Sharia Law.”205 A court petition challenging the amendment’s
constitutionality resulted in a temporary restraining order followed by
a preliminary injunction enjoining the state “from certifying the
election results for State Question 755.”206 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the injunction based on the
plaintiff’s Establishment Clause claim that the amendment
condemned Islam and exposed Muslims to disfavored treatment.207
201 S.B. 1028, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011) (as introduced by Sen. Ketron). For the
bill’s complete legislative history, see Bill Information for SB1028, TENN. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=SB1028&ga=107
(last
visited Mar. 26, 2012).
202 Pub. Charter No. 497, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011). For press accounts covering
public opposition and subsequent amendments to the bill, see Andrea Zelinski, Critics Say AntiTerrorism Bill Went from Bad to Worse to Much, Much Better, TN REPORT (June 3, 2011),
http://www.tnreport.com/2011/06/critics-say-anti-terrorism-bill-went-from-bad-to-worse-tobetter/ and Bob Smietana, Tenn. Bill Criticized for Targeting Muslims Splits Tea Party, USA
TODAY (May 22, 2011 6:16 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-05-22-tennesseebill-tea-party_n.htm.
203 Bill
Information for HJR 1056 (2009–2010), OKLA. ST. LEGIS.,
http://newlsb.lsb.state.ok.us/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=HJR1056&Session=1000 (last visited Mar. 26,
2012).
204 The question only landed on the ballot after securing 41–2 and 82–10 majorities in the
state Senate and House respectively. Id.
205 State Questions for General Election, Nov. 2, 2010, OKLA. ST. ELECTION BOARD, at 7
(Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.ok.gov/elections/documents/sq_gen10.pdf; Summary Results:
General
Election—Nov.
2,
2010,
OKLA.
ST.
ELECTION
BOARD,
http://www.ok.gov/elections/support/10gen.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2012).
206 Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff’d No. 10–6273,
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 475 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2012).
207 Awad v. Ziriax, No. 10–6273, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 475, at *37–40 (10th Cir. Jan.
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While the courts rightly identified this anti-constitutional and antiAmerican initiative for what it was, the reality remains that measures
like it tap into a bigoted stream of the political discourse in the United
States and elsewhere.208 These and other proposed measures that
violate domestic constitutional law and international law principles
present a concrete opportunity for civil society and government to get
in front of manifestations of intolerance. This can be done through
non-legislative measures designed to ostracize those that would
discriminate, impose unequal treatment, or otherwise unduly restrict
freedom of religion or belief. Public outcry, media attention, and
reliance on the judiciary can all be effective tools. But each can be
bolstered through ongoing educational efforts to help authoritatively
dispel oversimplification and misconceptions concerning minority
groups, religious practices, and even the function and status of
domestic law. Moreover, these measures are in no way contingent on
UN resolutions, and can serve as a tangible and good faith
demonstration of the sincere commitment to combat intolerance and
discrimination based on religious belief. Importantly, they also do not
require relying on tactics that themselves foster an environment of
discrimination and inequality, which in turn prohibit fair exercise of
freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief.
CONCLUSION
This Article has called attention to the flaws underpinning current
efforts to move away from the decade old debate over defamation of
religion. By advancing a consensus approach to combatting
intolerance without addressing and accounting for the false linkages
that continue to be made between incitement and defamation, states
concerned with protecting human rights have created an opening that
risks perpetuating defamation-type offenses under the ostensible
sanction of international law.

10, 2012).
208 The failed Oklahoma initiative aligns with Republican presidential candidate hopeful
Newt Gingrich’s endorsement of “hav[ing] a federal law that says under no circumstances in
any jurisdiction in the United States will Sharia [law] be used in any court to apply to any
judgment made about American law.” Marc Ambinder, Oklahoma’s Preemptive Strike Against
Sharia
Law,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
25,
2010,
10:10
AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/10/oklahomas-preemptive-strike-againstsharia-law/65081/; see also Scott Shane, In Islamic Law, Gingrich Sees a Mortal Threat to U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2011, at A2 (discussing Newt Gingrich’s position on Sharia law); Andrea
Elliot, Behind an Anti-Sharia Push, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2011, at A1 (discussing the national
movement against Sharia law, including the Oklahoma constitutional amendment).
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The evidence discussed above should shatter any illusion
regarding a genuine consensus around an approach to combatting
intolerance premised on “open public debate of ideas” and
“foster[ing] religious freedom and pluralism.”209 Malaysia’s
deplorable yet perfunctory decision to abide by Saudi Arabia’s
request for the deportation of alleged blasphemer Hamza Kashgari is
deadly evidence that defamation of religion remains alive and well,
and has even garnered sufficient international legitimacy to warrant
summary extradition for the purpose of its speedy enforcement. From
this perspective, the consensus approach also has failed in a
profoundly practical regard by doing nothing to curb prosecutions of
individuals on the basis of utterances or actions deemed blasphemous
of a predominant faith. A potential death sentence for three little
tweets throws this reality into unsettling relief.
This grim reality should be deeply disturbing to those concerned
with maintaining the integrity of the international human rights
framework. More immediately, however, it should serve as a trigger
for reassessing the wisdom of a consensus strategy premised upon
sidestepping or ignoring the specter of defamation of religion. Rather
than maintain the delusion that combating intolerance will prove a
viable end to a divisive debate, we must acknowledge that any
genuine consensus on this issue is destined to fail unless defamation
of religion is formally repudiated. Until such a time, progress within
the Istanbul Process should be suspended. Concerned diplomats and
human rights activists alike should return to familiar if divisive fault
lines and redouble efforts to condemn and abolish the criminal
offense of blasphemy. In Kashgari’s case, such efforts could—and
should—have included massive international pressure on Malaysia to
refuse the Saudi request to deport.210
209 Human

Rights Council Res. 16/18, supra note 7, ¶4 and ¶6(b).
White House and State Department have remained conspicuously silent, at least
publicly, concerning Malaysia’s decision to deport and Kashgari’s uncertain status in Saudi
Arabia. Patrick Goodenough, Obama Administration Silent on Saudi Journalist Accused of
Online Blasphemy, CNS NEWS, Feb. 15, 2012, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/obamaadministration-silent-saudi-journalist-accused-online-blasphemy. Remarks and a Q&A session
during Secretary Clinton’s trip to Riyadh at the end of March 2012 likewise made no mention of
Kashgari’s case or his continued detention. Remarks With Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Saud
Al-Faisal, Mar. 31, 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/03/187245.htm. The
European Union managed to produce several weakly worded statements expressing “deep[]
disappoint[ment]” with Malaysia’s decision to deport. According to Catherine Ashton’s
spokeswoman, “The EU will continue taking all appropriate steps to achieve a positive outcome
of Mr Kashgari's case.” AFP, Saudi blogger Hamza Kashgari, facing possible execution for
tweets,
to
be interrogated,
NATIONAL
POST,
Feb
14,
2012,
http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/02/14/saudi-blogger-hamza-kashgari-facing-possibleexecution-for-tweets-to-be-interrogated/. Speaking at the opening of a plenary session of the EU
Parliament, President, Martin Schulz “stressed the need to protect freedom of expression and
210 The
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More generally moving forward, governments that previously
voted against UN defamation of religion resolutions should inquire of
their counterparts that abstained whether they view the fate of
Kashgari and others similarly situated as comporting with
international human rights law protections. Likewise, individual OIC
members with ties to western states should be surveyed and new postArab Spring governments coming online should be encouraged to
clearly set out their intentions with respect to international human
rights obligations. These efforts may bear fruit in identifying a
previously unavailable critical mass of states willing to overturn the
UN’s defamation of religion precedent. At the same time, a good faith
effort to address genuine claims of discrimination, intolerance and
incitement should proceed apace, despite a freeze on identifying
implementing norms relating to Resolution 16/18 and its offspring.
These measures can go a long way in building good will and
demonstrating a sincere commitment to tackling the challenge of
intolerance without recourse to criminal punishment. Even if a UNsanctioned rejection of defamation of religion proves unachievable
and we are left debating its illegitimacy, nothing can justify
supporting a framework intended to combat intolerance that allows
acts of unbridled intolerance to continue to flourish.

undertook to do all he could to prevent a death sentence being pronounced.” It remains unclear
however, what, if any, subsequent measures the EU may have taken in this regard. European
Parliament, Minutes Monday, 13 February 2012 – Strasbourg, Item 13: Statements by the
President,
Feb.
13,
2012,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+PV+20120213+ITEMS+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN. See also European
Parliament, Opening: Saudi journalist faces death penalty, discriminatory Dutch web site, Feb.
13,
2012,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/content/20120203FCS37185/2/html/OpeningSaudi-journalist-faces-death-penalty-discriminatory-Dutch-web-site.

